


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

NORWEGIAN SECURITY DETERMINANTS:
DETERRENCE AND REASSURANCE

by

John J. Linnehan

March 1984

Thesis Advisor:

D. S. Yost

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Norwegian Security Determinants:
Deterrence and Reassurance

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

This research provides an analysis of Norway's security policy from World War II to the present. The growth of Soviet military power and the Norwegian response in the evolution of its security policy are discussed in order to discern the strength of NATO's northern flank. The adequacy of Norway's policy of detente and reassurance has been questioned with respect to the premise of warning time and reinforcement. Norway's policy has been successful, but with increasing national disunity regarding NATO's nuclear policy, the questionable "guarantee of reinforcement," and the need for political courage and decisiveness in a crisis. Given Norwegian disunity, the Soviet Union may be able to achieve limited goals in the North without resorting to force.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Norway (see Figure 1) has been compared with West Berlin in that it cannot be defended directly or readily protected by U.S. military power.¹ The defense of Norway in the face of the disparate military situation that prevails in the North is also based on the willingness of the NATO countries to resist Soviet pressure on Norway and on the capability of NATO to reinforce Norway in time of crisis. West Berlin is linked to West Germany and the rest of the alliance by air, rail and land lines which are subject to Soviet interdiction. With the expansion of Soviet capabilities in the North and in particular the expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet, Norway's ties via air and sea are also subject to Soviet interdiction.

The northern flank of NATO is of critical importance to the alliance but on the surface it appears to have been consigned a neglected role as a secondary front. This is borne out by a survey of the Washington Post and New York Times on articles concerning NATO's northern members (Norway, Denmark and Iceland). During 1980/81 the New York Times carried a total of eleven major articles (i.e., articles of more than 150 words) on Denmark and Norway but none on Iceland and the Washington Post only printed eight articles about Denmark and Norway and none about




Figure 1. Map of Norway

Iceland.² In examining Norway's role on the northern flank it is apparent that Norway plays a critical role and, as American defense expert Robert Weinland has said, "World War III may not be won on the northern flank but it could definitely be lost there."

Since "survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have,"³ Norway's choice of NATO membership as the best means to ensure its continued survival will be discussed in Chapter II. Since that decision in April 1949 the global strategic situation has changed. The basic changes and resultant effects on the forces will be discussed in Chapter III.

Norway has been criticized for now being willing to bear its fair share of the cost of the NATO alliance by its steadfast refusal to allow either foreign troops and bases or nuclear weapons on its territory during peacetime. This seeming incongruity can be readily understood in light of the two basic tenets of Norwegian security policy: deterrence and reassurance. NATO membership is the prime component of deterrence while the restrictions on Norway's participation in NATO are the primary elements of Norway's policy of reassurance. These will be discussed in Chapter IV.

With the Soviet Union as its northern most neighbor, Norway has a deep and abiding interest in detente and has actively sought to maintain a harmonious relationship with

the Soviet Union. The post war years have been characterized by a series of crises. These and the unresolved issues of Svalbard, the division of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and Norwegian-Soviet Gray Zone agreement will be discussed in Chapter V.

Another aspect of Norwegian security (Chapter VI) is the concept of a "Nordic Balance"⁴ which has been credited as one of the stabilizing factors in the North and as a contributor to the low state of tension which has been maintained there. In the last section, Chapter VII, the conclusions of this thesis will be presented and discussed.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

¹Herschel Kanter, "The U.S. Navy: Fleet of the Future or the Past?," Arms Control Today, July 1978, p. 3.

²Annelise Hopson, "Could NATO Be Better Understood?," NATO Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, July 1983, p. 24. (This may be a comment on the U.S. public's level of interest rather than on the degree of attention NATO devotes to the northern flank.)

³Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 92.

⁴For purposes of this paper the Nordic area will be the area encompassed by Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Some authors, when referring to Scandinavia, will include Iceland in this grouping.

II. NEUTRALITY TO ALLIANCE

A. BACKGROUND

Norway prior to World War II has not participated in a war since 1814, when Norway was ceded to Sweden by Denmark in the Treaty of Kiel signed on 14 January 1814. This Swedish-Norwegian Union was long troubled by Norwegian agitation. This agitation, coupled with a conflict over business interests, in particular the interests of an ocean going merchant marine on Norway's part, led to a dissolving of the Union in 1905. Norway became an independent country partly through a need for an independent foreign policy based on economic concerns rather than through disagreement with Sweden over a policy of neutrality.⁵ In fact, Norway pursued a policy of neutrality from its independence until its involvement in the Second World War.

B. NONALIGNMENT

Norway successfully maintained her position of neutrality during World War I. This is not to say that Norway's neutrality was "sacrosanct." Norway protested both Allied and German actions, with the first of such notes being delivered in November 1914.⁶ Trade was balanced between Germany and Britain, with the former receiving fifteen per cent of Norway's fish catch and the latter eighty-five per cent.⁷ The Scandinavian policy

of neutrality was reaffirmed in meetings of foreign and prime ministers in Copenhagen and Oslo in 1916 where a joint policy concerning the handling of belligerent violations of neutral rights was established.⁸

The war years were in fact a period when large profits were gained from neutrality. "The warring powers outbid each other to secure goods and services, and the Germans paid liberally for clandestine purchases of goods from America and other overseas sources which had been allowed through the Allied blockade for use inside Scandinavia."⁹

This is not to say that Norway did not pay a cost for its "non-involvement." The Norwegians had been induced to charter most of their 2 1/2 million tons of shipping to Britain with the resultant loss of over 1 million tons and 2,000 lives to German action.¹⁰ Aside from these losses, though, Norway survived relatively intact.

The interwar years were a period of economic crisis where Norway saw the League of Nations as an agency for the maintenance of world peace based on democratic principles and collective security. Norway maintained from the outset that one of the primary functions of the League was to organize world disarmament.

In keeping with this policy Norway cut back its defense forces. Norway felt that League membership represented only a qualified abandonment of their traditional

neutrality and that by taking a lead in disarmament both their neutrality and survival in an uncertain world would be enhanced. Efforts to arm were viewed as unnecessary and provocative and behind the "somnolent military was a somnolent Storting (Parliament) and a somnolent people."¹¹ The interwar years produced no major reevaluation of Norwegian security policy, and the eve of the war found Norway with a small army, 57 obsolete naval craft and a few antiquated fortifications.

In April 1938 the Scandinavian foreign ministers had committed their countries "to stand outside all power combinations, refuse to be drawn into war, and aid each other economically."¹² Norway's position was again reaffirmed in the Spring of 1939 when Norway refused to enter into a non-aggression pact with Germany. When the war in Europe erupted in September 1939, the Norwegians were bent on preserving their neutrality.¹³ The Scandinavians held several ministerial conferences and at a meeting in Copenhagen the ministers formally declared their neutrality, pledged their mutual assistance, and drafted a joint declaration on Nordic nonintervention in the war.¹⁴ In part these efforts were an attempt to buttress Finland against Soviet pressure - an effort that ultimately failed. Once Finland had been attacked by Soviet forces, the British and French requested permission to cross Norwegian and Swedish territory to render

assistance to the beleaguered Finns. Permission was refused by both Norway and Sweden as it would violate their positions as neutrals.¹⁵

Norway's neutrality was only respected by either side as long as its own interests were served. Joseph Stalin is credited with having stated that anything could be argued except geography,¹⁶ and it was the geography of Norway which proved her ultimate downfall. For Norway there was the danger of German actions to ensure continued use of the Norwegian Leads for the shipping of Swedish iron ore and to obtain a better striking position for ships and aircraft against the Allies in the North Atlantic. These fears were counterbalanced by fears of "British and French action to stop the ore to Germany ... and because Churchill was likely to regard the German use of the passage through the Norwegian Leads as calling for drastic naval action."¹⁷

As for the Germans, Hitler wished to preserve the neutrality of Scandinavia, which worked to his advantage. The Germans were utilizing the Norwegian offshore islands to provide protection for Swedish iron ore shipments and to mask the movement of captured ships. "Hitler's belief that the neutrality of Scandinavia worked to his advantage was strictly conditional upon the continued acceptance of that advantage by his opponents"¹⁸ and in February 1940 the British gave clear indications that Norwegian neutrality would no longer be respected. The British seized the

ALTMARK on 16 February 1940 in Jossingfjord as it covertly transited Norwegian waters with a cargo of 299 prisoners of war (British seamen seized by the GRAF SPREE).¹⁹

The British and French decided that the ore traffic and other German violations of Norwegian neutrality could no longer be tolerated. With this in mind they reached a decision that they themselves would have to violate Norway's neutrality by mining the Norwegian Leads.²⁰ On 5 April 1940 "notes were handed by the British ambassadors at Oslo and Stockholm to the Norwegian and Swedish governments informing them of the British intention."²¹ Both countries protested; to the Norwegians, the danger appeared to be not from the mines themselves, but rather in the German reaction to them.²²

Prior to these actions Hitler had had an invasion plan of Norway drawn up. The stated goal of this plan was that "This operation should prevent British encroachment in Scandinavia and the Baltic; further it should guarantee our [German] ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain."²³

British minelaying took place on the morning of 8 April 1940, while Hitler's troops were already embarked for the "Weserubung" (German code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark). German troops landed at 0415 on the morning of 9 April 1940. Norwegian neutrality had come to

an abrupt end, and the British move designed to "violate" Norway's neutrality had been preempted. Neither the Allies nor the Germans could allow this area to remain neutral. Norwegian forces were eventually withdrawn, together with a British contingent from north Norway. Norway itself was governed as a conquered province while the legitimate Norwegian government formed a government-in-exile in London.²⁴

C. ATLANTIC POLICY

Norway had seen the failure of its policy of neutrality. In December 1940, Trygve Lie, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, made intimations to the British Foreign Office, suggesting that "states bordering on the North Atlantic had vital defense interests in common and therefore ought to act together in peace time for the protection of those interests."²⁵ These ideas were broadcast in a speech to Norway on 15 December 1940 and "represented a complete break with Norway's non-aligned past."²⁶ It was envisioned that this policy of cooperation would include both the U.S. and Britain. It came to embody Norway's "Atlantic Policy." As Professor Arne Ording, an adviser and chief architect of Lie's policies, said, "it was an attempt to nail the Anglo-Saxon great powers to their responsibilities in Europe." In an address to the House of Commons, Trygve Lie reiterated his

call for an "Atlantic Association" and projected such a grouping as a possible nucleus for a collective security scheme.

The British and Americans were not enthusiastic about this proposed arrangement for the post war world. Fears concerning Soviet responses were partially laid to rest as a result of talks between Stalin and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Stalin appeared to think in terms of "spheres of influence", which seemed to "envisage both a British centered military alliance in North Western Europe and British naval bases in Norway and Denmark, as a counterpart to territorial adjustments and security arrangements for the Soviet Union along its Western frontiers."²⁷

In May 1942 the Norwegian cabinet issued a public document entitled "Principal Features of Norwegian Foreign Policy." This document formally endorsed Norway's "Atlantic Policy" and stated that "until it becomes possible to create an effective and universal League of Nations, Norway will be compelled to seek security in regional arrangements."²⁸

In January 1944 a change of emphasis occurred. First priority was now given to the universalist concept of the United Nations. This shift may have reflected a growing responsiveness to Soviet concern and interest. In

April 1943 the Norwegian government-in-exile had received a message from the Soviet ambassador cautioning that Norway should make sure of a good relationship with the Soviet Union, which was also a power with Atlantic interests.²⁹ In addition, Norway now encountered a refusal on the part of America and Britain to send an expeditionary force to assist in Norway's liberation and it appeared that the Soviets would be the first Allied troops on Norwegian soil. The other Allies did not desire to send forces to Norway to offset the Soviet presence.

On 18 October 1944 Russian forces crossed into Northern Norway and from this point on the prevailing mood in the Norwegian government was one of "disillusionment with the Western powers and deep suspicion of Soviet aims in the North."³⁰ Norway returned to a formal policy of non-alignment in 1945. The Germans practiced a policy of scorched earth as they retreated from the North and on 5 May 1945 the German occupation forces in Germany surrendered. Concern over the removal of Russian troops and the Soviet demand issued by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov issued in late 1944 that the Spitzbergen Treaty be revised to reflect a "condominium" with Norway over Svalbard and that Bear Island be ceded to the Soviets dominated Norwegian thought. The Soviet demand was based on Svalbard's use during the war.³¹ The weak Norwegian position necessitated the issuance of a joint secret

declaration on 9 April 1945 and the opening of formal talks with the Russians, which were eventually terminated in 1947.³² (Svalbard will be further discussed in Chapter V.) The last Soviet troops withdrew from Norway on 25 September 1945. The last American force in the country (a listening post on Jan Mayen Island) was not withdrawn until 1946.

D. POST WAR YEARS

"The five Nordic countries (see Figure 2) emerged from World War II in widely differing political and economic positions and having undergone contrasting experiences. This combined with international developments during the first post war years..."³³ is credited with being the cause of the different approaches taken towards security by the Nordic countries. This will be examined in regard to Norway for whom the creation of the United Nations appeared to answer Norway's security problems and seemed to be compatible with Norway's view of neutrality and world wide cooperation.³⁴

Norway emerged from the war without a staggering national deficit due to the revenues obtained from the use of its Merchant Marine by the Allies during the war. However, Norway still faced enormous reconstruction tasks and lacked the necessary resources for this purpose and to



Figure 2. Map of Scandinavia

build up Norwegian armed forces to a level sufficient to ensure Norwegian neutrality.

In the initial post war years, the United States emphasis had been on Europe solving its own security dilemma; but, as the "Cold War" emerged, the call came "to stand up and be counted in the struggle with Soviet Communism."³⁵ This was in juxtaposition to the Norwegian policy of "bridge building," which assumed that Great Power disputes were "a result of a lack of confidence and misunderstandings."³⁶

Norway's policy of bridge building had as its goals the strengthening of the international system, making collective security work by facilitating Great Power cooperation and the keeping of Northern Europe free from Great Power rivalry and tension. These goals were to be implemented by not entering into a political or military alliance with any country, by refraining from introducing complicated issues upon which the great powers disagreed to international forums (e.g., the question of the fate of Jews in post war Europe) and by avoiding action that might cast doubt upon Norway's impartiality towards and independence of the Great Powers. This desire to avoid actions which might bring about Soviet displeasure was seen as the reason for the cancellation of a visit by Winston Churchill to Norway as a result of his "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, U.S.A. in March 1946. The invitation,

extended by the King, had been accepted, yet within a month after the speech it was announced the visit was off.³⁷

Norway initially sought post war security in the United Nations. "Participation in the United Nations in 1945 was not understood to involve a complete abandonment of neutrality. The United Nations was an international organization not an alliance and because it was an international organization, membership in it was appropriate to noncommitted nations desirous of remaining outside Big Power conflicts."³⁸

Given the blatant disregard for Norway's neutrality, the wartime experience convinced the Norwegians that neutrality itself would not deter an aggressor and thus Norway searched for a new security policy. With such events as the refusal of the East Europeans to participate in the Marshall Plan, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the first Berlin crisis, and Soviet pressure on Finland, collective security in some form of alliance again became appealing. Unfortunately, the United Nations had failed to live up to Norway's hope as a viable form of collective security.

At this point Norway had also received reports from Helsinki, Warsaw, and Moscow that Norway might soon be faced with a request from the Soviet Union to negotiate a pact with the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Assistance.³⁹ In

light of these reports a resolution of the security dilemma in the North became even more important.

E. A SCANDINAVIAN PACT

As early as May 1945 the Swedish Prime Minister, at a meeting of Scandinavian Labour Party delegates, proposed a regional defense league under United Nations auspices. This proposal met with little success. When, in December 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin issued a call for the countries of Western Europe to unite against the Soviet threat, Sweden became concerned regarding the possibility of changes in the balance of power in Northern Europe if Norway and Denmark entered into alliance with the West. The Swedish Foreign Minister thus on 3 May 1948 proposed a Scandinavian Defense Pact based on neutrality. In September 1948 a joint defense committee of the Scandinavian countries was set up to examine the possibility of a Scandinavian association independent of the West.

Within the United States and Britain it was feared that a "neutral Scandinavian arrangement could be forced by the Soviet Union to grant concessions which would jeopardize Atlantic lines-of-communication as well as the security of the British Isles."⁴⁰ The Scandinavian countries disagreed over the essential characteristics of the proposed association. Norway and Denmark were leaning towards an

alliance with ties to the Western powers that would be strong enough to prevent a war, but in the event a war did come, the ties would be strong enough to offer protection to small as well as large powers. However, Sweden continued to emphasize her position of neutrality by stating that Sweden must be free "to choose the road of neutrality" and "not to join any great power bloc, either by a specific treaty or alliance or by silent acquiescence in joint military measures in the event of a conflict."⁴¹ The Norwegians had called for joint staff talks with the West which the Swedes adamantly refused, insisting the proposed alliance must be neutral rather than linked to any power bloc.

The United States came out at this time against a Scandinavian Defense Pact and asserted that military assistance would be directly linked to stronger ties to the emerging "Atlantic Alliance." As the amount of United States military supplies available was limited, the State Department in September 1948 announced that "those countries that joined the common Atlantic effort would be served first."⁴² This was even more evident in NSC 28/1, which was approved on 4 September 1948. It halted arms sales to Norway and Denmark pending the outcome of base negotiations for Spitzbergen and Greenland. Sales were resumed to Norway on 4 December 1948 after the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported Spitzbergen was not required as a

base.⁴³ This "arms argument" served as a handy instrument and allowed pressure to be applied to ensure Norway made the correct choice. Norway's final decision on the abandonment of neutrality was also influenced by a belief that outside military aid was required if Scandinavian defenses were to be built up to an adequate level. The Norwegians doubted the capacity of the Swedish armament industry to fulfill this need. Additional "incentives" were provided through the use of economic aid to entice and reward cooperation. Norway and Denmark received 20 million dollars each in the quarter April-July 1948, while Sweden as the most "recalcitrant" and uncooperative Scandinavian country received nothing.⁴⁴ During this same period, the need for basing forces within Norway had been discussed, and the Norwegians received assurances that bases would not be necessary. With this in mind Norway actively sought further information on the proposed "Atlantic Alliance."

On this scene the first of the Soviet notes concerning Norwegian participation in the proposed alliance arrived. Norway was warned concerning the establishment of foreign bases on its soil by Soviet diplomatic notes on 29 January 1949 and again on 5 February 1949, with the additional offer of a Non-Aggression Pact between Norway and the Soviet Union. Norway responded that:

"...forced by the disappointing performance of the United Nations to seek increased security through regional cooperation, it had looked into the possibilities of a northern defense union without positive result and now intended to investigate more the matter of participation in a regional security system comprising countries on the Atlantic."⁴⁵

In addition, Norway issued a unilateral statement saying that Norway would "never lend itself or its territory to a policy of aggression, nor would it grant bases for foreign armed forces as long as Norway was not attacked or threatened."⁴⁶ Subsequent statements by the Norwegian government repeatedly emphasized the unilateral character of this statement and stated Norway's right to decide for itself when it was threatened and to allow the prepositioning of equipment and efforts to ensure a rapid reinforcement in time of crisis.

The question of the Scandinavian countries participating in the emerging Atlantic Alliance became much more complex in January and February 1949. The Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of Norway, Denmark and Sweden met in Karlstad, Sweden on 5 and 6 January 1949 to discuss the possibility of a Scandinavian Defense League. Numerous prior meetings had been held and the report of the Defense Committee appointed in September 1948 was discussed at this meeting.⁴⁷ The report highlighted the point of view that a common military effort would substantially increase the defensive power of the

three countries through a widening of the strategic area, preparatory planning and a standardization of equipment. The report also stressed that for a credible defense it was an absolute prerequisite that there be a substantial rearmament of Norway and Denmark, and that it would be necessary to obtain military equipment from countries outside the Scandinavian area on favorable economic terms. The report did not assume that Scandinavia would automatically be involved in a Great Power conflict, but did emphasize that without outside military assistance the Scandinavian alliance would not be able to hold off an aggressor for any length of time.⁴⁸

The Swedes insisted that no steps be taken which might compromise the neutral policy⁴⁹, which had brought them alone of the Scandinavian countries unscathed through six years of war in Europe. The Norwegians were equally insistent that no alliance be formed on terms which would make American military supplies unavailable in an emergency. The Swedish additionally proposed a joint strategic planning board and program, the standardization of all types of war materials, the creation of unified forces for certain areas (Øresund, Skagerak, Kattegat and the Swedish-Norwegian border), and the unification of the three air forces. The Norwegians refused as the Swedish proposal precluded any association with a North Atlantic Pact and applied only to the metropolitan territory of an

ally and not to overseas territories such as Greenland or Spitzbergen.⁵⁰ The alliance would have had to remain neutral unless directly attacked.

Norway and Denmark had told Sweden in January 1949 that their "agreement in principle" to a Scandinavian pact was conditional on the United States agreeing to furnish arms to the members of the pact. In an attempt to clarify this point Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange visited Washington in February 1949 and was told in substance that "an unattached Scandinavian Defense Union could not expect political or military support from the [United States] government and that Norwegian participation in the Atlantic Pact would not involve requests to establish joint or United States bases on Norwegian soil."⁵¹ In light of the Norwegian desire for a guarantee of military supplies, and a Swedish refusal to compromise and give up a chance to stay out of war before the threat of involvement actually developed, negotiations for a Scandinavian pact fell apart and each country went its own way.⁵²

F. MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

The change from neutrality to alliance was considered so significant that the Norwegian government sought approval before even opening negotiations to join the proposed "Atlantic Alliance." On 3 March 1949 the Storting met in secret session and voted 130 in favor of membership

and 13 opposed. In addition, the Soviets were told of the government's opinion that "there was no need to duplicate pledges of non-aggression both nations had given in subscribing to the United Nations Charter."⁵³ Norway then entered into formal negotiations, which culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949.

G. SUMMARY

"For the Norwegian decision to reject non-alignment in favor of NATO membership, the Soviets have only themselves to blame."⁵⁴ The experience of the war had conditioned the Norwegians to change, but it was the Berlin blockade; the coup in Czechoslovakia; and especially, the Soviet pressure on Finland, which was forced in April 1948 to accept a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, that crystalized Norwegian resolve. These events, coupled with the reports of an impending request on Norway for a treaty with the Soviet Union similar to Finland's, provided the spark for change. In addition, Norway had come to realize that she "could not opt out of the international power game."⁵⁶ "Because of the strategically important location of northern Norway, a possible conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was seen to make pre-emptive moves against her (Norwegian) territory very likely,

regardless of Norway's own policies."⁵⁷ Adam Ulam, in Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, explains the Soviet failure to react strongly to Norwegian NATO membership as a result of the Soviet leadership's preoccupation with eastern and southeastern Europe. Stalin may also have failed to anticipate the increasing strategic importance of this area and its future growth as a focus of Soviet naval and strategic power. Over time the area's strategic significance has increased rather than diminished.⁵⁸ Thus membership in NATO remains even more vital and is reflected as one of the "cornerstones" of Norwegian foreign policy. The launching of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 consolidated the reorientation of Norwegian defense policy brought about by World War II.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

⁵An in depth discussion of the history and course of the Norwegian-Swedish Union and its dissolution is provided in Raymond E. Lindgren, Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion and Scandinavian Integration, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

⁶Franklin D. Scott, Scandinavia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 204.

⁷Britain was able to obtain this solution due to its naval dominance at the time. Ibid, p. 204.

⁸Denmark and Sweden also pursued a policy of neutrality throughout the war and often acted in concert with Norway for the furtherance of neutral's rights. Lindgren, p. 241.

⁹Thomas K. Derry, A History of Scandinavia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, p. 304.

¹⁰The Norwegian loss was 49.3 per cent of its 1914 Tonnage. In absolute terms, only Britain sustained a heavier loss than Norway, whose place among the mercantile marines of the world fell from fourth to sixth place. Scott, p. 216.

¹¹Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p. 5.

¹²Scott, p. 211.

¹³Derry, p. 328.

¹⁴Lindgren, p. 255.

¹⁵Derry, p. 334.

¹⁶To Finnish delegates in the Kremlin in October 1939. Quoted by H. Gunnar Hagglof, "A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War," International Affairs, London, April 1960, p. 153.

¹⁷Derry, p. 328.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 334.

¹⁹Scott, p. 216.

²⁰British and French plans and preparations are fully discussed in J.L. Moulton, A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions: The Norwegian Campaign of 1940, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1967.

²¹Ibid, p. 58.

²²Ibid, p. 59.

²³Derry, p. 324.

²⁴The formation of the government-in-exile and Norway's relations with its war time allies are chronicled in Nils Morten Udgaard, Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy November 1940 - February 1948, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973.

²⁵Olav Riste, "The Genesis of North Atlantic Defense Cooperation: Norway's Atlantic Policy 1940-45," NATO Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 1981, p. 23.

²⁶Ibid, p. 24.

²⁷Ibid, p. 24.

²⁸Ibid, p. 28. This policy is also discussed in Udgaard, pp. 24-29. It should be noted that the Norwegian government-in-exile made an agreement with the Home Front (Norwegian Resistance) not to enter into any post-war agreements until the war was over.

²⁹Riste, p. 29.

³⁰Udgaard, p. 68.

³¹Despite the Treaty of 1920 which precluded military fortifications or use, both sides utilized the island for various purposes during the war. This use is described in Tim Greve, Svalbard, Norway in the Arctic, Oslo: Oyvind Skagmo, Groudahl and San Trykkeri AS, 1975.

³²Udgaard, p. 88.

³³Ulstein, p. 5.

³⁴Ibid, p. 8.

³⁵Geir Lundestad, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945-1949, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 86.

³⁶Udgaard, p. 187.

³⁷Ibid, 193.

³⁸John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965, p. 111.

³⁹Lundestad, p. 178.

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 250.

⁴¹Wuorinen, p. 111.

⁴²Grethe Vaerno, "Norway and the Atlantic Alliance 1948-1949," NATO Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 1981, p. 19.

⁴³In point of fact the JCS was not unwilling in the face of Soviet demands on Spitzbergen to make a deal: American bases on Iceland and Greenland in exchange for Soviet bases on Spitsbergen. Lundestad, pp. 66-76.

⁴⁴Monetary aid was less subject to American control as the European Recovery Program became fully operational under the management of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

⁴⁵John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1948-1949, New York: Harper and Brother, 1949, p. 535.

⁴⁶Ibid, p. 536. This concern over Soviet reactions and interests came to be embodied in one of the two basic tenets of Norwegian security policy. These two tenets were later identified as "deterrence" and "reassurance." NATO came to be the prime component of deterrence and Norway's unilateral restrictions on its participation (no bases or nuclear weapons on its territory) in NATO and its restriction on exercises in North Norway and east of 24° E Meridian came to embody "reassurance." A thorough discussion of Norwegian security policy is contained in Johan Jorgen Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, Oslo: Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1982.

⁴⁷This report was originally due in February 1949 but moved forward at Norwegian insistence even though it meant a less detailed examination of the proposed league.

⁴⁸Sven Henningsen, "Denmark and the Road to NATO," NATO Review, Vol. 27, No. 6, December 1979, p. 21. The recommendations that the committee proposed are contained in Lindgren, pp. 260-263.

⁴⁹Swedish neutrality was not as effective as this position might indicate. In reality the Swedes in the first weeks of the Norwegian Campaign allowed certain "humanitarian traffic" (German troops) to pass over the Swedish railway system. This cooperation (acquiescence) gradually broadened into a transit agreement. The transit traffic with Norway was allowed to grow to the point where it included war materials and in total over two million military passengers. German reinforcements were sent from Norway via Sweden to Finland for the Russian Campaign. These violations of neutrality were viewed as the lesser of evils and credited with forstalling German action against Sweden.

⁵⁰Halvard M. Lange, Norges Vei Til NATO (Norway's Road to NATO), Oslo: PAX Forlag A/S, 1966, p. 31. This work presents the entire process of Norway's move from neutrality to alliance from the viewpoint of a major participant, the Norwegian Foreign Minister at the time.

⁵¹Campbell, p. 537.

⁵²Denmark approached Sweden about a defense pact between the two countries, but this was rejected by the Swedes as being unrealistic.

⁵³Campbell, p. 538.

⁵⁴Robert K. German, "Norway and the Bear," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1982.

⁵⁵Ibid, p. 58.

⁵⁶Riste, p. 29.

⁵⁷Udgaard, p. 253.

58The increasing significance of this area has been reported in numerous articles. One such is General Sir Anthony Farrar Hockley, CINC AF NORTH, "Defense in the Higher Latitudes," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 26, April-May 1981, pp. 18-21.

III. SOVIET AND NORWEGIAN FORCES

A. BACKGROUND

As French diplomat Jules Cambon once said, "The geographical position of a nation ... is the principal factor conditioning a country's foreign policy - the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all."⁵⁹ This is particularly true in Norway's case. It was Norway's geographical position which largely led to her entry into NATO. With her entry into NATO, Norway, despite her reservations on the stationing of foreign troops or the presence of nuclear weapons on her territory, assumed the role as guardian of NATO's Northern Flank.

Norway was secure in her role of Guardian initially because of the United States monopoly on atomic weapons and the promise of rapid reinforcement by sea from Norway's NATO Allies. The unchallenged naval might of the United States supplemented by that of the United Kingdom guaranteed the safety of the vital North Atlantic sea lines-of-communication (SLOC) and the ability of Norway's NATO Allies to reinforce Norway in time of crisis.

The Soviet Northern Fleet emerged from World War II as the smallest of the Soviet's four fleets and did not present the same threat it does today. It is today the largest and most powerful of the Soviet Fleets. The United

States no longer holds a nuclear monopoly and Soviet naval capabilities have grown significantly in the last twenty years. In addition, when discussing threats to Norway, the Soviet Baltic Fleet and those of its Warsaw Pact Allies, Poland and East Germany in particular, must be considered. For the Soviet Baltic Fleet to reach and participate in a battle for the Atlantic, the Soviets must seize control of the Danish Straits. This would necessitate the seizure or destruction of the airfields and harbors in the southern part of Norway. Thus, the threat to Norway is larger than that represented by the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula.

B. THE SOVIET UNION'S POSTURE

Despite the Soviet Union's massive size, it has a distinct disadvantage as a sea power in that its access to the high seas is dependent on passage through straits to the open sea. These straits leading to and from the Soviet naval ports on the Pacific, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea can be covered with detection devices to observe and track Soviet ship movements, controlled or even blocked in the event of war. This raises the question of why the Soviet Union would install such a crucial strategic asset (the Northern Fleet with its large proportion of the Soviet SSBN Fleet) on a largely icebound peninsula, contiguous to a NATO member capable of monitoring fleet movements and at

the end of sea lanes choked by NATO Territory.⁶⁰ This situation is compounded by the fact that despite the warming influence of the Gulf Stream, which maintains Murmansk ice free year round, the Arctic ice-pack (which never closes closer than 360 miles) and the seasonal winter ice force some channelization of the Soviet fleet as it moves toward the open sea. This egress to the Atlantic must cross three possible choke points: (1) Norway's North Cape - Spitzbergen Island (winter ice here could force units even closer to the Norwegian coast); (2) Greenland - Jan Mayen Island - Lofoten Islands; and (3) Greenland - Iceland - United Kingdom (G-I-UK Gap).

The coast of the Kola Peninsula is ice free all year as far east as Svyatoy Nas and is the only coast in the European Soviet Union with direct access to the sea. This explains the Soviet use of the Kola Peninsula - it is better than any other available alternative and with its relatively free access to the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans it also satisfies distance requirements to patrol and target areas. In addition, the NATO members or the Nordic Countries have adopted policies to reassure the Soviet Union (restrictions on basing and nuclear weapons) of the defensive nature of the alliance and the lack of threat to Soviet interests. This area has maintained a relatively low state of tension and proven more stable than the

Southern Flank. By being on the flank it has avoided NATO's preoccupation with the Central Front.⁶¹

The Soviets have developed a large military complex centered along the Murmansk Fjord with the chief base of the Northern Fleet at Polyarny. There are repair facilities located at Rosta, production facilities for ballistic missile submarines at Severomarsk, and a submarine yard at Severodvinsk (which has been claimed to have an annual output equal to that of all American submarine building facilities combined).⁶²

Accompanying the increase in military facilities the population of the Kola Peninsula has tripled since World War II, and Murmansk has become the world's largest city north of the Arctic Circle. Murmansk serves as the terminus of a 900 mile railroad from Lennigrad and has become a vital unloading and transshipment point. The entire peninsula has undergone a period of industrial, economic and military development. A modernized canal linking the Baltic and White Sea's (see Figure 3) is capable of transferring surface or submarine units with a displacement of up to 5,200 tons, which means that ships of the KRESTA Class (5,000 ton displacement) can utilize the canal. NATO officials assume that destroyers of the KRIVAK, KASHIN, KELDIN and KANIN Classes and ballistic missile boats of the HOTEL, WHISKEY and GOLF Classes would

be able to utilize the canal without being subject to direct NATO observation.⁶³




Figure 3. White Sea - Baltic Canal

In addition to this area's military value to the Soviet Union, it is a significant economic center for the Soviets. It provides twenty per cent of the Soviet Union's fish products. The peninsula contains copper, nickel and uranium and has the necessary infrastructure to process these ores. The lumber industries produce paper pulp, turpentine, resin, cellulose, building materials and prefabricated houses. In addition, Murmansk straddles two oceans - the Atlantic and the Arctic. With the use of

icebreakers there is also the Northern Sea Route (NOSERO), which runs from Murmansk on the Barents Sea across the top of Russia to Provideniya on the Bering Sea. Unfortunately, this route is open only a few months a year and requires icebreakers to complete.⁶⁴

The most significant change in the north, though, has been the rapid growth of Soviet military capability in the area. The Soviet military buildup is most dramatically displayed by the change of the Soviet Navy from a coastal defense force at the end of World War II to the powerful global force of today. The latter part of this growth is illustrated in Table I.⁶⁵ This growth reflects the changing strategic situation in the north and the dual function of the Northern Fleet as the primary threat to the NATO sea lines-of-communication and the main component of the strategic submarine force of the Soviet Union.

Michael McGwire has stated that "the Soviet Navy's most important mission is the contribution it makes to the Soviet long range nuclear strike capability."⁶⁶ Since the Northern Fleet is the only Soviet Fleet with an unimpeded access to the open ocean, it comes as no surprise that 65 per cent of the Soviet strategic missile carrying submarines and 60 per cent of the nuclear-powered submarines are stationed here.⁶⁷ The Northern Fleet has had priority in the assignment of both ships and planes.⁶⁸

TABLE I
DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY

Deployment of the Soviet Submarine Fleet (approximate figures)												
	Northern			Baltic			Black Sea			Pacific		
	1968	1975	1982	1968	1975	1982	1968	1975	1982	1968	1975	1982
Nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN) (D, Y & H)	14	38	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	11	24
Ballistic-missile submarines (SSB) (G & Z)	21	15	3	-	-	6	-	-	-	14	8	7
Nuclear guided-missile submarines (SSGN) (P, C & E)	18	28	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	12	20
Guided-missile submarines (SSG) (J & W)	13	16	10	6	2	4	-	1	2	3	9	4
Nuclear Submarines (SSN) (A, V, E & N)	10	26	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	6	19
Submarines (SS) (T, B, F, R, Q, Z & W)	105	55	52	63	74	34	40	44	20	62	46	47
Total	181	178	178	69	76	44	40	45	22	100	92	121

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships 1982-83* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1982)

TABLE I (Continued)

Deployment of Soviet Surface Ships (approximate figures)												
	Northern			Baltic			Black Sea			Pacific		
	1968	1975	1982	1968	1975	1982	1968	1975	1982	1968	1975	1982
CV	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
CHG	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-
Guided-missile cruisers.												
CG (Kara,												
<i>Kresta,</i>	3	7	11	2	2	-	2	5	7	2	3	10
<i>Kynda</i>)												
Light cruisers												
CL (Sverdlov,	2	3	2	4	5	2	5	5	3	4	3	4
<i>Chapayev</i>)												
Guided-missile destroyers												
DDG (Kashin,												
<i>Kildin, Kanin,</i>												
<i>Krivak, Kothli</i>												
(SAM) <i>Krupny</i>)	6	9	11	7	14	4	11	15	15	4	9	10
Destroyers												
DD (Kotlin,												
<i>Tallinn,</i>												
<i>Skory</i>)	18	13	5	15	14	15	18	14	9	25	18	8

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships 1982-1983* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1982)

The most noteworthy event on the Northern Flank has been the increase in the range of Soviet SLBMs.⁶⁹ The result of this increase in range has been to change the Norwegian and Barents Sea from transit routes to firing positions for the YANKEE Class Submarines to patrol and firing positions for the DELTA and TYPHOON Class Submarines. No longer is it necessary for the Soviet SSBN force to run the G-I-UK Gap (see Figure 4). NATO had sought to exploit this geographic choke point by forming a series of anti-submarine barriers composed of underwater acoustic sensors (Sound Surveillance System) (SOSUS), maritime surveillance aircraft, surface naval vessels and attack submarines (see Figure 5).⁷⁰ The extended ranges were a result of a desire not to increase the operating areas of their SSBN force but rather a desire to protect it from NATO (primarily the United States) ASW forces and locate it where its forces could be supported by Soviet Naval Aviation.⁷¹ Thus, the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea have, in the words of Michael McGwire, become "SSBN bastions."⁷²

Accompanying these changes in the Soviet SSBN force has been an increase in the Soviet Union's ability to contest western naval power as a result of qualitative improvements in both the Soviet Surface Force and its attack submarines. These improvements have been accomplished primarily by the introduction of new units and the retiring of older units.




Figure 4. Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap




Figure 5. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Barriers

In recent years, the Northern Fleet has seen the introduction of the nuclear powered KIROV Class Cruiser, the KRASINA Class Cruiser, the KIEV Class Guided Missile Aircraft Carrier, and the UDALOY and SOVREMENNY Class Destroyers. In addition, the IVAN ROGOV Class Amphibious Assault Ship, the ALFA Class SSN, and the OSCAR Class SSBN were introduced first to the Northern Fleet. In total, the Northern Fleet encompasses approximately 600 ships including nearly 70 major surface combatants and 130 attack submarines.⁷³

The Kola Peninsula is an important early warning and defense area. It houses a large number of radar installations, ground-to-air missiles and interceptor aircraft. The region's air defense forces include more than 200 interceptors (over 100 of these are stationed on the peninsula itself) and some thirty ground-to-air missile stations (SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5) with more than 200 launchers.

No fighter-bomber aircraft are permanently deployed to air bases on the Kola Peninsula. The tactical aircraft on the peninsula belong to the Frontovaya Aviatsia and include two squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft (MIG-21 FISHBED and MIG-25 FOXBAT) located at the top of the panhandle. There are a total of 16 airfields with runways of 2,000 meters. Eight of these are operated by the Air Defense Force (PVO-strany) of the Archangelsk Air Defense District.

The 13th Tactical Air Army of the Leningrad Military District includes 120 fighters (fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft) and some 200 helicopters and transport aircraft. The Leningrad Military District includes a Long Range Aviation component of some dozen medium bombers. In addition, the perimeter acquisition radars for the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system deployed around Moscow are situated here.⁷⁴

The Naval Air Force of the Northern Fleet is composed of 250 aircraft, including 65 subsonic bombers, an equal number of long range reconnaissance aircraft, as well as anti-submarine warfare aircraft, helicopters and transports. Soviet air capability in the Northern Theater is shown in Figure 6.

Three Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) bases are located around Kandalaksha and equipped with nine SS-5 "SKEAN" launchers. With a range of 2,500 nautical miles they are most likely targeted outside the Scandinavian area. These rockets could be replaced by the SS-20 rocket. SS-20 rockets on the European continent with their range of 3,500 nautical miles can easily strike Scandinavian targets.

The ground forces on the Kola Peninsula have remained fairly stable over time.⁷⁵ The ground forces on the Kola Peninsula consist of two Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRD), the 45th MRD in the Pechenga/Murmansk area and the



Figure 6. Soviet Air Capability in the Northern Theater

341st MRD at Kandalakska. Each of the divisions has more than 12,000 men and around 200 tanks. The support units include one missile brigade of SCUD and FROG Launchers. These missiles are capable of carrying both nuclear and chemical warheads and are part of a Soviet modernization program. The SS-23 missile with a range of 300 miles is replacing the 180 mile SCUD Missile and the SS-21 missile with a range of 75 miles is replacing the 45 mile range FROG Missile.⁷⁶ The coverage of the Nordic area by NATO and Soviet missiles is shown in Figure 7. Additional divisional support units include one Artillery Brigade (122 and 152mm) and one Air Defense Regiment (SA-4). There is also the 63rd "Kirkenes" Marine Infantry Regiment at Pechenga with about 1,900 men. The peacetime strength is on the order of 30,000 to 40,000 men. All units are in Category I as first line Soviet divisions maintaining full equipment and 85 per cent or more of their wartime establishment.⁷⁷

The divisions of the Kola Peninsula are subordinate to the 6th Army Headquarters at Pelrozavodsk. Six Motorized Rifle Divisions of lower readiness are found in the Leningrad Military District (LMD). Two of these are located around Archangelsk and the other four are located further south. Strategic reserves may be drawn from the Oral, Volga, Moscow and Kiev Military Districts when needed. An Airborne Division is deployed near Pskov. The




Figure 7. Nordic Nuclear Coverage

Motorized Rifle Divisions of the Leningrad Military District do not appear to have an offensive thrust. They are equipped with old T-54/55 tanks rather than the new T-64 tank, with the BRT-60 armored personnel carriers rather than the new BMP, and they rely on towed rather than self-propelled artillery.

In addition to these forces, the Soviets are able to call on the assistance of their Warsaw Pact allies for operations against the Danish Straits and Southern Norway. The Soviet Baltic Fleet would be supplemented by the navies of both Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This creates an impressive force capable of extensive amphibious operations with a naval infantry force of about 10,000 men. Despite only having landing craft to accommodate half of these forces, with the use of merchant marine forces, which are subject to Soviet Armed Forces control and use, this problem can be overcome. In addition to these forces, the Soviets have six GOLF-II Class Ballistic Missile Submarines equipped with three SS-N-5 SERB Nuclear Missiles with a range of approximately 850 miles stationed in the Baltic.

As John Erickson has commented on the growth of Soviet power in the North:

"The result of this military, industrial, and political activity has been to implant one of the strongest -- possibly the strongest -- complex of bases in the world in the immediate neighborhood of Norway, housing strategic forces capable of and committed to

operating far beyond the Soviet periphery plus tactical forces deployed to protect these bases and embodying the capability of seizing and holding any appreciable territorial buffer zone in order to guarantee that self-same "protection."⁷⁸

C. NORWEGIAN RESPONSE

Norwegian Defense Policy has rested upon four major themes:

- (1) NATO Membership is necessary as Norway recognizes it is unable to defend itself by national means alone.
- (2) Security reflects a balance of insurance (deterrence) and reassurance. (These will be discussed in the following chapter.)
- (3) Linkage of Norwegian Security to Europe's Security is a means of preserving a low military posture in Northern Europe.
- (4) A credible organization for reinforcement is a necessity. This reflects a belief that security is better served by contingency plans than by the actual deployment of forces to Norway.⁷⁹

Norway believes that the Soviet military concentration at Murmansk is part of the global competition between the superpowers rather than a force directed mainly at Norway.⁸⁰ Within this context Norwegian Defense Policy is a combination of both "deterrence" and "reassurance," whereby Norway's primary objective is to attempt to prevent

the achievement of a quick outcome in a war and thus prevent a fait accompli thus ensuring NATO's reinforcements can be deployed in time to have an effect on the outcome of the war.

Norwegian Armed Forces are structured with this objective in mind. The Armed Forces are organized under the Minister of Defense. Beneath him is the Chief of Defense (CHOD). From here the chain of command goes to the Inspector Generals of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Home Guard. As Chiefs of their respective services, the Inspector Generals are responsible for training, tactics and supply. Operationally, Norway is divided into separate Northern and Southern Commands, which in time of war, would come under the NATO Commander in Chief, Northern Europe (CINC NORTH). The exact composition of each component branch is contained in Table II.

(1) Army - The Army includes 24,000 men, of whom 17,800 are conscripts. A reduced battalion of 450 men is garrisoned at the border in Kirkenes. Another battalion of 1,000 men is located in the Lakselv Area. The Northern Brigade, composed of 4,000 men and a squadron of LEOPARD Medium Tanks, is deployed in the Trans-Skiboth Valley Area. An infantry company is posted to Bodo to protect COMNOR Headquarters. The rest of the Army's forces are located in Southern Norway where the majority of units are stationed

TABLE II

COMPOSITION OF NORWAY'S MILITARY

Population: 4,100,000
 Military Service: Army 12, Navy and
 Air Force 15 months
 Total Armed Forces: 42,100
 (28,900 conscripts)
 GDP 1981: kr 283.36 billion
 (\$49.37 billion)
 Defense Expenditure 1981: kr 9.45 billion
 (\$1.65 billion); NATO definition not
 available
 GDP Growth 1980: 3.8%
 Inflation: 13.7% (1980), 11.9% (1981)
 \$1 = 5.739 kroner (1981)

ARMY: 24,400 (17,800 conscripts)
 1 brigade group of 2 infantry battalions,
 1 tank company, 1 special field company,
 1 AA battery (North Norway)
 1 all-arms group; 1 infantry battalions,
 1 tank company, 1 special field company,
 1 AA battery (South Norway)
 Independent armed squadrons, infantry
 battalions, and artillery regiments
 78 Leopard 1; 38 M-48 MBT; 70 NM-116 M-24
 90) light tanks; M-113 APC; 250 105mm and
 155mm howitzer; 130 M-109 155mm special
 nowitzer; 107mm mortar; Carl Gustav 84mm,
 106mm RCL; ENTAC, TOW ATGW; Rh-202 20mm,
 40mm AA guns; RBS-70 SAM; 24 C-1E,
 5 L-18 light aircraft
 Reserves: 122,000: 4 divisions; 11 Regimental
 Combat Teams (brigades) of about 5,000 men
 each, SPT units and territorial forces;
 21 days refresher training each 3rd/4th
 year. Home Guard (all services) 85,000
 (90 days initial service).

NAVY: 9,400, including 1,600 coast artillery
 (6,100 conscripts)
 14 Type 207 submarines
 5 Oslo frigates with 6 Penguin SSM, 1x3 Sea
 Sparrow SAM
 2 Sloop corvettes
 39 FAC(M) with Penguin SSM: 19 Storm,
 14 Hawk, 6 Snogg
 8 Tjeld FAC(T)(in reserve)
 1 Vadsø patrol craft
 2 Vidar minelayers, 9 ex-U.S. MSC-60
 minesweepers, 1 minchunter
 1 Horten depot ship
 7 LSM: 2 Kvalsund, 5 Reinoysund
 40 coast artillery batterys: 75mm, 105mm,
 127mm, 150mm guns

Bases: Horten, Gergen, Ramsund, Tromsø

Reserves: 16,000. Coastguard established
 as part of Navy; 3 Nordcap patrol vessels
 with 6x1 Penguin 11 SSM, 6 Lynx helicopter.

AIR FORCE: 8,300 (5,000 conscripts);
 114 combat aircraft
 4 FGA squadrons: 3 with 51 F-5A; 1 with
 16 CF-104C/D, 2 TF-104B
 1 interceptor squadron with 15 F-16A
 1 reconnaissance flight with 6 RF-5A
 1 MR squadron with 7 P-3B
 1 OCU with 13 F-5B, 4 F-16B
 1 ASW helicopter squadron with 6 Lynx
 (coastguard)
 2 transport squadrons: 1 with 6 C-130H,
 3 Falcon 20S; 1 with 4 DHC-6 aircraft,
 8 UH-1B helicopter
 1 SAR helicopter squadron with 10 Sea King
 MK 43
 2 utility helicopter squadrons with 26 UH-1B
 16 Safari training aircraft
 AAM: Sidewinder. ASM: Bullpup.
 4 light AA battalions with L/70 40mm guns
 1 SAM battalion (4 batteries) with
 128 Nike Hercules
 (On order: 44 F-16A, 8 F-16B fighters;
 RBS-70 SAM; Penguin 111 ASM)

Reserves: 20,000. 7 light AA battalions
 for airfield defense with L/60 40mm guns.

FORCES ABROAD: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 851;
 1 battalion, 1 service company,
 1 medical company.

and trained. When fully mobilized, Norway can field 13 infantry brigades.

(2) Air Force - Currently the Air Force consists of a mixture of 114 old and new combat aircraft. Three squadrons with a total of 51 F-5A's are being phased out and replaced with F-16A's. One squadron with F-16A's is currently operational. The total number of aircraft, when rephased, will drop to a level of 72 F-16's, which will fill both the fighter and attack role. These moves are to be coupled with efforts to equip airfields with modern anti-aircraft systems.⁸¹

(3) Navy - Naval assets consist of 14 KOBLEN Type 207 Submarines. Some of these units will be modernized, some retired, and some will be replaced by six new submarines to be purchased from West Germany. The Navy also contains five OSLO Class Frigates, two SLEIPNER Class Corvettes and four active squadrons of Fast Patrol Boats (FPB's) equipped with PENQUIN Surface-to-Surface Missiles. It should be noted the creation of a Norwegian 200 mile economic zone has created enforcement problems which have affected the Navy. A Coast Guard has competed with the Navy for scarce funds. The coastal fortresses controlling guns, torpedo batteries, and mines have been undergoing modernization.⁸²

(4) Home Guard - This force consists of 85,000 personnel who have undergone training and maintain their weapons and uniforms at home and are available for immediate call up and use in local areas.

(5) Civil Defense - Norway maintains a Civil Defense Program which consists of emergency training, required shelters, and plans for the evacuation of urban population centers.

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, there is a large asymmetry in the standing forces of the North. How then is Norway able to maintain her position with regard to her powerful Neighbor? The answer is by a combination of "deterrence" and "reassurance."

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

⁵⁹Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. VIII, 1930, p. 174. Cited by Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. I, 1957, p. 309.

⁶⁰Holst, Five Roads to Nordic Security, p. 117.

⁶¹The Soviet choice of the Kola Peninsula for the concentration of Soviet forces as the best of a limited series of choices is discussed in Colonel Arthur E. Dewey, USA, "The Nordic Balance," Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 118, December 1980, p. 54.

⁶²Marian K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank, New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979, p. 8.

⁶³Jacquelyn N. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Soviet Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO, Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1978, p. 28.

⁶⁴This year saw the early closure of the route and the trapping of Soviet merchant ships in the ice. The Northern Sea Route is discussed in Commander Clyde A. Smith, USN, "Constraints of Naval Geography on Soviet Naval Power," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974 and in Captain E. Synhorst, USN, "Soviet Strategic Interest in the Maritime Arctic," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, 1973.

⁶⁵This table contains two sections, one on the growth of Soviet submarine forces and one on the growth of Soviet surface forces. It is from Erling Bjol, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper 181, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, p. 23.

66Michael McGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Sea Power," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, 1980, p. 168.

67Johan J. Holst, "Norway's Search for a NORDPOLITIK," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, Fall 1981, p. 65.

68Norwegian analyst John Kristen Skogan points out that since 1975 the Soviet Pacific Fleet has grown at a slightly faster rate than the Northern Fleet. From 1968 to 1975 24 new SSBN's went to the Northern Fleet and six to the Pacific. Between 1975 and 1978 ten went to the Northern Fleet and nine to the Pacific. Since 1978 the SSBN's in the Northern Fleet fell from 48 to 45 while in the Pacific the number of SSBN's grew from 20 to 24. For guided missile cruisers (CG) the North grew from seven in 1975 to eleven in 1982. The Pacific Fleet grew from three to ten. Skogan relates this changed pattern to the introduction of the SS-N-18 missile while others have seen it merely as an attempt to redress an imbalance in Soviet Naval forces. Anders Sjaastad and John Kristen Skogan, "The Strategic Environment of the North Atlantic and the Perspectives of the Littoral States," Ed. Christoph Bertram and Johan Jorgen Holst, New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977, pp. 19-29; John Kristen Skogan, "Nordfladen, Utvikling, Status, Utsikter (Northern Fleet, Development, Status, Outlook)," Internasjonal Politikk, Oslo: NUPI, 1978, pp. 491-517; Ian Bellany "Sea Power and the Soviet Submarine Forces," Survival, January/February 1982, pp. 2-9.

69Prior to 1968 the mainstay of the Soviet SSBN force was the HOTEL Class Submarine armed with the SS-N-5 SLBM with a range of 700 nautical miles. In 1968 the YANKEE Class Submarine was introduced carrying the new SS-N-6 missile with a range of 1300 nautical miles. The DELTA Class Submarine carrying the SS-N-8 SLBM with a range of 4300 nautical miles was introduced in 1972. The latest addition is the TYPHOON Class Submarine equipped with the MIRVed SS-NX-20 missile with a range of 5150 nautical miles which places all of NATO Europe and the United States within its reach.

70 NATO ASW capabilities in the North Atlantic are discussed in the following articles: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1979, New York: Crane Russak and Company, Inc., 1979, Chapter 8: Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and its Complications for a Counterforce First Strike, pp. 427-452; Norman Freidman, "SOSUS and U.S. ASW Tactics," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1980, pp. 120-123; Owen Wilkes, "Ocean Based Nuclear Deterrent Forces and Anti-Submarine Warfare," Ocean Yearbook 11, Ed. Elizabeth Mann and Boyse Norton Ginsburg, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 226-249; Joel S. Wit, "Advances in Anti-Submarine Warfare," Scientific American, February 1981, pp. 31-41; and in several articles in Christoph Bertram and Johan Jorgen Holst, Ed., New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977.

71 In his writings Admiral Gorshkov has repeatedly criticized the German high command for failing to support the operations of its submarine force with aircraft and surface ships. Exercises have shown these forces in operations together and in wartime it can be expected that these forces would operate in support of each other.

72 This position is supported in Steven E. Miller, "Cold War in the Cold: Soviet-American Naval Rivalry in NATO's Northern Flank," Prepared for Conference of Ford Foundation Centers on International Security and Arms Control, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 21-22 January 1982. The author also discusses the employment of the Soviet Yankee Class Submarines in light of the "bastion" idea. Johan Jorgen Holst in Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1982 does not readily accept the concentration of Soviet strategic submarines in the Polar basin for practical and operational reasons.

73 This and much of the information used in the subsequent paragraphs was obtained from Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, pp. 9-12.

74 One of the most comprehensive analyses of all aspects of the Soviet presence in the north is contained in John Erickson, "The Northern Theater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," Strategic Review, Summer 1976, pp. 67-82.

⁷⁵Some analysts have viewed this as a form of Soviet restraint brought on by Soviet regard for the "Nordic Balance" (which will be discussed in a later chapter).

⁷⁶John C. Ausland, Norge og en Tredje Verdenskrig (Norway and a Third World War), Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983, p. 71. Ranges are approximations derived from both the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1982, New York: Crane Russak and Company, Inc., 1982 and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982-1983, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.

⁷⁷Erickson, p. 70.

⁷⁸Ibid, p. 68.

⁷⁹Johan Jorgen Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy and Peace in Nordic Europe," World Today, Vol. 37, No. 1, January 1981, p. 22.

⁸⁰Kenneth A. Myers, "North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank?," Washington Papers, Vol. 6, No. 62, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p. 48.

⁸¹Norwegian Defense Review Commission Abstract Chapter 21, Oslo: Defense Department Press Service, May 1978, pp. 44-51.

⁸²Ausland, p. 90.

IV. DETERRENCE AND REASSURANCE

A. NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY

With the large disparity in forces in the North, the Norwegian Government has stated, "The primary aim of our security policy is to prevent war and to protect our sovereignty, our freedom of action, and the right to determine our own society."⁸³ Within this guideline the additional objective has been established to, "...contribute to peaceful relations between nations."⁸⁴ In order to fulfill these goals in the post war years, Norway changed from a policy of neutrality and bridgebuilding to a policy of alignment in the form of NATO Membership. This alliance membership has led to the creation of Norway's Policy of "Deterrence and Reassurance." NATO Membership is viewed as a purely defensive measure and by following a policy of "reassurance." Norway attempts to indicate this to the Soviet Union.

B. NATO AND SOVIET CALCULATIONS

In the event of a great power conflict, the area of northern Norway would have significant value to both sides. For both sides it would be of paramount importance to prevent the other side from taking advantage of the area.

For NATO the North Cape area serves at least as a forward observation post.⁸⁵ From the Soviet viewpoint, they would desire to conduct a preemptive attack in order to accomplish the following objectives:

- (1) obtain the use of Norwegian airfields and fjords;⁸⁶
- (2) prevent the use of the Norwegian Sea by forces hostile to the Soviet Union;⁸⁷
- (3) interdict NATO's sea lines-of-communication;
- (4) protect, support and carry out amphibious operations against other strategic areas (i.e., the Central Front);
- (5) prevent the use of Norway as an offensive bridge-head against Soviet forces or territory; and
- (6) enhance Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine offense and defense.⁸⁸

Present Soviet naval and air capabilities are more than sufficient for defense of local sea areas in the Barents and Baltic Seas, but extending these defenses westward and providing operational freedom for surface forces in the North Atlantic would require prior neutralization of NATO air forces and air fields and Soviet control of Northern Norway. Thus, a preemptive move against Norway would allow the Soviets to utilize Norway's 1,647 mile coast line (if fjords are included, Norway's convoluted coast line jumps to over 13,000 miles) for naval bases and with the

utilization of Norwegian air fields would greatly extend Soviet capability for sea control, SSBN defense, and the ability to interdict vital sea lines.⁸⁹ Thus, "the strategic value of North Norway is not therefore connected with membership in NATO, but arises simply because of the lie of its land and seas."⁹⁰

C. DETERRENCE

Deterrence is the restraining or discouraging of a course of action by an opponent through the use of uncertainty or a fear of the consequences. As part of Norway's security policy, deterrence is designed to inhibit the Soviet Union and thus prevent aggression. This policy is embodied in the actions of the Norwegians themselves and in Norway's membership in NATO.

Norway's membership in NATO constitutes the major deterrence component of Norway's security posture. The credibility of this deterrent is directly related to NATO's ability to provide adequate reinforcements in an effective and timely manner. NATO and Norway are actively engaged in efforts to enhance this capability.⁹¹

1. Allied Air Reinforcements

These efforts have come to be embodied in Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) Rapid Reinforcement Program, which Norway became a participant in December 1982. This plan calls for the relocating of

around 1,900 American, Canadian, and British aircraft to Western Europe in a crisis situation. Approximately 350 of these aircraft are assigned to AFNORTH, with half of these being relocated in Norway. (This does not include the 75 aircraft that will come to Norway as part of American Marine Corps Reinforcement.)

Spare parts for Allied aircraft were stored for Allied aircraft at Norwegian airfields in the 1950's. These parts were destroyed as they became obsolete. In 1960, Norway concluded an agreement (INVICTUS) with the United States regarding the storage of fuel, lubricants, spare parts, and ammunition for maritime aircraft contributing to NATO's defense of the Trans-Atlantic sea lines-of-communication. In 1980, the agreement was extended to include emergency evacuation of U.S. carrier based aircraft to airfields in mid-Norway where fuel and equipment to service such aircraft were to be stocked.

In 1974, Norway and the United States concluded an agreement for the transfer of American fighter squadrons to Norway in time of a crisis. In this regard, Norway has eight air stations (six of these are indicated in Figure 8) participating in NATO's Collocated Operating Bases (COB) Programs, with plans to receive a squadron (a squadron may vary between 18 and 24 aircraft each). Prestocking of ammunition, drop tanks and maintenance equipment began in 1979 when logistic support agreements for the respective




Figure 8. NATO's North

air stations were signed. The goal was to be able to operate the fighter aircraft for a period of seven days after arrival in country. It should be noted that in addition to receiving these fighter squadrons, Norway can expect to receive a significant number of transport aircraft, as men and supplies are airlifted to Norway. SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Program, in addition to American reinforcements, calls for two Canadian squadrons of F-5's (negotiations are in progress to locate these squadrons at Andoya Air Station) and a British Jaguar Squadron to reinforce North Norway.

2. Allied Ground Force Reinforcements

On 16 January 1981 Norway and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding governing the prestockage and reinforcement of Norway. In accordance with this agreement, the United States would procure the necessary equipment to support the ground element of a Marine Air/Ground Amphibious Brigade (MAB), and store that equipment in Norway. Prestocking Marine Corps equipment in Norway and having Marines flown in by air would overcome the problem of moving reinforcement forces by sea (a two to three week process dependent upon warning time) and ensure that the Marines would be available to defend the area rather than forced to recapture it.

A MAB comprises about 10,000 men, with infantry, artillery, and combat service support equipment. In

addition, it comprises an Aviation Combat Force of two Air Defense Squadrons, two Close Support Squadrons, as well as approximately 75 Heavy Transport and Light Support Squadrons. The equipment to be prestocked includes 24 155 mm howitzers and associated vehicles, bridging equipment, approximately 250 trucks with about 100 trailers, ammunition, fuel, and food. Several aspects of this agreement will also be discussed in the subsequent section on "reassurance." Norway is committed to supply host-nation support⁹² and to seek through NATO infrastructure procedures to provide adequate prepositioning facilities.

It should be noted that the MAB is dedicated to the reinforcement of Norway within the NATO Chain of Command. What this means is that the "United States may provide, consistent with SACEUR requirements, a U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade."⁹³ In other words, the MAB remains a key element of SACEUR's flexible strategic reserves and may in actuality be employed elsewhere. Even if deployed to Norway, it must be at the request of the Norwegian Government and is not automatic. Once deployed and "married up" with their equipment in Central Norway, it is not a foregone conclusion the MAB would be deployed to North Norway. The Memorandum of Understanding states that the Marines would be transported from Central Norway to

other threatened areas in Norway.⁹⁴ The first storage of ammunition commenced in the fall of 1982.

In 1979, Norway concluded an agreement for storage of oversnow vehicles for the 42nd and 45th Commando Groups of the British Royal Marines. They are not dedicated to the reinforcement of Norway, but could be sent to Norway by Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in an emergency. The Royal Marine Commandoes receive regular training and are part of the 3rd Commando Brigade, which also contains a company of Dutch Marines.⁹⁵

A Canadian Brigade Group is earmarked for reinforcement of Norway and consists of about 4,000 men. Presently only one battalion and its equipment can be airlifted to Norway. The others must come by sea. Negotiations concerning the prestockage of heavy equipment for one battalion are currently in progress.

The only other force likely to be called upon to reinforce North Norway is the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. This force consists of about 4,000 men drawn from seven nations. It would expect to be deployed to a contingency area in advance of other reinforcements. By so doing, it would demonstrate the solidarity and determination of NATO to defend one of its member countries. The force's stated prime mission is to deter aggression by its timely deployment. The ACE Mobile Force participates in exercises in Norway every second year and

consists of three battalions, artillery, and support units, as well as an air component of four squadrons of fighter aircraft.⁹⁶ Fuel installations and other facilities have been emplaced at Bordufoss Airfield, which is the main reception station for the land elements of the AMF in an emergency.

3. Allied Maritime Reinforcement

Norway has actively participated in NATO's common infrastructure program since 1952. This program has included the establishment of a series of fuel and ammunition depots for Norwegian and Allied naval forces. Originally, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States were identified as user nations.

With the admission of West Germany to NATO, the question of German access was raised. This question was raised by the perception that now Southern Norway was protected via a forward defense perimeter in the Baltic via the forces of Denmark and West Germany. In the event of a collapse of NATO forces in the region, Southern Norway would serve as the evacuation point for surviving forces. The forces would be unable to take ammunition, supplies, or fuel and thus would be dependent upon stores within Norway. In addition, the Norwegian Government, despite protests by the Soviet Union, held that its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany would be on the same level as its

relations with other allies regarding access to common infrastructure installations in Norway.

SACEUR concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in 1962 with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense concerning the control, operation, and maintenance of NATO's maritime depots in Norway. In 1964, the Royal Norwegian Navy entered into an agreement with the West German Navy concerning the storing of ammunition, fuel, and medical equipment in Southern Norway. Construction of a large fuel depot for NATO's maritime forces in mid-Norway at Namsenfjorden is in progress. It will be built and operated as a fuel depot for both civilian and military purposes.

In the event of an emergency the primary maritime support would come from SACLANT's Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic (MARCONFORLANT), which consists of Striking Fleet Atlantic and amphibious forces. Striking Fleet Atlantic may include two to five aircraft carriers with 250-450 fighter aircraft. The exact composition of this task force⁹⁷ may vary in composition depending upon SACLANT's ability to meet competing claims for scarce resources and the threat to the task force's survivability in the Northeast Atlantic. The amphibious element could consist of the British/Dutch Commando Brigade and a Marine Amphibious Brigade. In addition to these forces, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STAVNAVFORLANT) could render

assistance. It normally consists of five to eight destroyers and is a means of demonstrating Allied might and resolve.

4. Allied Exercises⁹⁸

NATO exercises are viewed as a means of stabilizing the military situation, communicating a NATO commitment, and as a form of reassurance rather than as an opportunity to convey a special message or as a response to a specific action or policy of the Soviet Union. Allied participation in military exercises in Norway is seen as a means of substantiating the claim that the defense of Norway is not only a national responsibility but a responsibility of the entire alliance and is within the military capability of Allied forces. Norway uses the exercises as a factor contributing to the deterrence of Soviet aggression by creating an impression that non-Norwegian forces would have to be fought at an early stage in any conflict. Norway also uses the exercises to show restraint and as a form of reassurance. The role of exercises in "reassurance" will be discussed later.

A pattern of exercises has crystalized over the years. Within this pattern the Norwegian Northern Brigade carries out annual exercises in the fall (BARFROST) and winter (KALD VINTER). The Canadian Brigade Group scheduled to reinforce Norway in time of crisis sends a company to participate in both exercises. The Royal Marines of the

42nd and 45th Commando Groups undergo annual winter training (CLOCKWORK in North Norway and PENDULUM and MAINSPRING in South Norway). Every second year the AMF carries out a major exercise (EXPRESS) in Norway.⁹⁹

These exercises are supplemented by SACLANT's participation in three recurring fleet exercises (NORTHERN WEDDING, OCEAN SAFARI, and TEAMWORK) involving ocean areas off Norway. Each exercise occurs every four years with TEAMWORK including a phase with ground forces. The United States Marine Amphibious Brigade and United Kingdom Royal Commando Brigades participate in these quadrennial exercises.

5. Mobilization, Terrain and Climate

The Norwegians have adopted the policy that Northern Norway can be more readily reinforced from Southern Norway than by outside assistance. The Norwegians estimate that within a 48 hour period that the Norwegian Army can increase its strength in Northern Norway from one brigade to five brigades mostly through local mobilization. These forces would be in addition to the forces of the Home Guard.¹⁰⁰ At present equipment is stored in the north for a brigade that can be flown in from the south in under 24 hours. Present defense plans call for the prepositioning of the equipment for a second brigade in the north. When the Norwegian Army is fully mobilized it will contain 13 brigades.

In addition to these forces, the countryside itself plays a major role in the planned defense of Norway. All routes from the Soviet Union into Norway and southwards are channelized through valleys where steep mountainsides prevent the outflanking of defensive positions by armor or mechanized divisions. Ideal chokepoints for defense are created by the meeting of Norway's deep fjords and inland mountain ridges. Any amphibious invader would have to penetrate fairly deep into the fjords to reach a point where sloping beaches replace towering cliffs at the water's edge. Wet, moorish land coupled with a lack of roads and numerous boulders further hamper vehicle movements. Rear Admiral Reider Berg of Norway's Northern Command has stated that the "Terrain is our best defense but its benefit could be overridden by surprise."¹⁰¹

An additional ally reveals itself in the very climate itself. There is no "dry cold" due to the mediating influence of the Gulf Stream and thus a "wet cold" - the worst condition a soldier can meet¹⁰² - predominates. The climate is unforgetting and allows for no margin of error on the part of individual or organization. Mere survival can take the total effort of men in this environment at times.¹⁰³ At times the rivers and lakes are frozen hard enough to use as highways but at other times they may merely serve as potential traps. In summer, the days are long and there is little,

if any, darkness to provide cover; while in winter, the long Arctic nights of continuous darkness present another problem in that close air support of ground forces becomes extremely difficult. It has been said that in Norway an all-weather fighter aircraft is all-weather only in the air defense role. Snow reduces the effects of ordnance and one Norwegian officer claimed that if they were to use the close air support weapons they have in winter, they would keep the aircraft on the ground 22 hours a day.¹⁰⁴

6. Logistic Support

It is envisioned that only ten per cent of the supplies and equipment sent to Europe in a NATO war would go by air. The other ninety per cent must, by necessity, come by sea. It is envisioned that the initial airlift would be in excess of 30,000 men and 20,000 tons of supplies. This is in addition to the 2,000 tons needed per day to meet civilian requirements, the daily air force requirement of 1,000 tons per day and a daily combat requirement of 2,000 tons per day. This is a daily requirement of 5,000 tons a day in excess of the initial lift.¹⁰⁵

NATO does not have enough air transport available to ensure rapid reinforcement by air, nor does Norway have the capacity to receive a massive airlift or rapidly move these supplies onward. Two-thirds of the bases available are located in the south where they are distant from the

most likely area of conflict and hence need. In the north, only Bodo and Bardufoss are suitable for airlift purposes - Evenes being short of parking space and Barnak too exposed. In addition, a total reinforcement by air necessitates control of the airspace of the intended area and places reinforcement in a position where it is hostage to the whims of the weather. Air reinforcement necessitates Norway to retain both use and control of the air stations. Norway is in the process of upgrading the defense capabilities of its air stations by acquiring surface-to-air missiles for them. It must be remembered that these fields are sure to be a high priority for seizure or neutralization by Soviet forces.

As regards sealift, Norway only has a single port capable of ramp unloading of vehicles. The Soviet Union has the largest and most diverse stock of mines in the world and they can be deployed by aircraft, surface warships, merchant ships, or submarines. This is further underscored by estimates that the Soviets may have as many as 500,000 mines in stock. Mine countermeasures are a national responsibility to be carried out prior to the arrival of allied reinforcements.¹⁰⁶ Norway has nine minesweepers and one minehunter. These forces are of 1950 construction with the minehunter most recently modernized in 1978. While carrying out minesweeping operations these units will be especially vulnerable to air attack.

The Soviets can use submarines, surface units, and aircraft, such as the BACKFIRE bomber¹⁰⁷ to perform the anti-SLOC mission interdicting NATO reinforcements and supplies enroute. While mines can be used to isolate the landing ports, the Soviets have the capability to conduct air or missile strikes against these terminals and their distribution networks for the onward movement of supplies.¹⁰⁸ In Norway's case, the situation is further complicated by infrastructure problems.

The main supply routes are almost totally restricted to the single north-south E-6 road and its intersecting east-west secondary roads. E-6 crosses a number of vulnerable bridges and ferries. Only one railroad line runs north from Oslo and it ends at Bodo, 1,200 kilometers from Norway's northernmost border. The daily requirement for the onward movement of 5,000 tons of supplies is double the capacity of the existing road system under favorable air defense and climatic circumstances.

The mere shipment of the supplies and reinforcements creates a problem in and of itself.¹⁰⁹ The years since World War II have seen a steady decline in the size of militarily useful dry cargo ships, which has fallen from 2,400 to about 440 ships. The United States can rely on six sources of ships to meet its commitment to a sealift reinforcement of Europe. These sources are:

- (1) the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Controlled Fleet;
- (2) the United States Merchant Marine Fleet;
- (3) the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF);
- (4) the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF);
- (5) the Effective United States Controlled (EUSC) Fleet; and
- (6) the NATO pool ships.

Each of these sources has its own mobilization problem. The NSC ships are presently in use and only a small portion could be made available on short notice. The United States Merchant Marine Fleet has steadily declined since World War II and these ships too are dispersed around the world. The RRF ships have only a modest carriage capacity in its 29 ships while 129 of the 170 NDRF ships are remnants of the original Victory Ship Fleet built during World War II with an average age of nearly 40 years. The EUSC is made up of United States owned ships registered under the flags of Honduras, Panama and Liberia. These ships are in use world-wide, thus presenting a mobilization problem augmented by the fact they are manned by foreign crews who may not wish to man these ships in a crisis situation. In addition, many of these ships are not self-sustaining because they require cargo handling facilities which may not be available in a crisis due to their likelihood of becoming wartime targets.

The last source of ships is the NATO pool. The European NATO allies have agreed to augment United States sealift capabilities by providing 400 high capacity liners in a NATO mobilization situation. To ensure a prompt availability of the 400 ships a specifically controlled reinforcement pool of over 600 ships have been created. These ships might not be readily available as they are engaged in commerce and their owner nations may have other competing mission requirements.

7. Warning and Decisions

No matter how well coordinated or preplanned the reinforcement of Norway is, it is dependent upon two other factors. One is the perception that a situation exists which calls for reinforcement, and the other factor is that a decision to actually request forces from outside the country must be made. Early commitment of reinforcements thus depends on both unambiguous warning of aggression and early political decisions by the countries concerned. NATO ministerial guidance in 1977 directed that reinforcement and augmentation forces should reach a potential area of conflict before aggression takes place or depending on the warning time given, early enough to affect the initial course of hostilities.

It was formerly held that it would take 30 days for the Warsaw Pact to mobilize its forces for an attack on Western Europe and that NATO would have 23 days to mobilize

its own forces. This was intended as a basis for calculation, not as many observers assumed, as an intelligent prediction.¹¹⁰ Today some analysts predict the Soviets could launch an unreinforced attack on the central front with as little as two days notice and in the case of Norway the Soviets could launch a reinforced attack within 48 hours. An unreinforced preemptive attack is another Soviet option in the North.¹¹¹

A decision by the Soviets to attack in any area of NATO is likely to be made long before the actual outbreak of hostilities. Due to the risk of escalation,¹¹² both horizontal and vertical, any decision would have to be evaluated carefully and there must be a high likelihood of victory. In order to enhance their chance of success the Soviets can be expected to attempt to mask their preparations. They will attempt to make what was once an anomaly, such as a surge of naval forces into the Atlantic, into a routine pattern, such as a yearly exercise. Thus, moderate increases in activity over a period of years or months, or a series of training evolutions over a period of time, could lessen the value of mass movements as an indicator. The majority of the Northern Fleet could put to sea in 48 hours. The DELTA Class SSBN can strike targets in the United States from Murmansk and thus, need only move a short distance to sea for dispersion. Seeking strategic surprise, the Soviets would be willing to make some

sacrifice and a less than fully deployed Navy is an obvious choice.¹¹³ At present, only 15 per cent of the Soviet SSBN force is deployed at any one time. With the collapse of the INF talks and Soviet threats to station more missiles at sea capable of striking the United States in the same amount of time that NATO Pershing missiles require to strike the Soviet Union, a change in the Soviet pattern of SSBN deployment might be expected. To meet the time requirement of 10 to 12 minutes the SSBNs would of necessity be stationed much closer to the continental United States. With this reduced range, the older Soviet SSBNs such as the YANKEEs are a natural choice.

The other factor is that, once the warning is given, early and brave political decisions must be made. In this instance, Norway would have to request assistance and the other NATO allies would have to agree to commit the requested forces. The decision to request assistance in Norway's case would have grave political consequences, because it would bring to an end Norway's policy of not permitting the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime. This ban does not apply when Norway is attacked or threatened, thus highlighting the need for the threat to be readily identified and understood.

During a time of rising tension a decision to ask for reinforcements could be viewed as destabilizing, as it could aggravate Soviet fears and thus appear provocative.

There would be a temptation to delay implementation of reinforcement plans in hope that the Soviets would reevaluate the situation and unwind. To aid the Soviets, this argument need not succeed, it need only retard NATO actions.

The decision process in NATO is also fraught with peril. NATO can respond on several levels - economically, politically or militarily. Coordinated Alliance action requires that none of the member nations objects. When governments have divergent views, negotiations continue until a unanimous decision is reached. For NATO as a whole to take action, all sixteen countries would have to agree on the most appropriate response and its implementation. In a crisis on the Northern Flank this agreement may not be readily available if a member hesitates to commit NATO forces to an area where the local balance of power is so markedly in the Soviet Union's favor.¹¹⁴

This does not preclude an Alliance member from providing assistance on a national basis. In the case of the United States, the use of U.S. Marines embarked in amphibious units would have two advantages. First, because these units would be onboard ships and not necessarily landed in country, they might be perceived as less provocative while still demonstrating U.S. support. Second, being onboard ships in international waters, they do not have to be requested by the Norwegians, nor are they subject to

Norwegian restrictions or domestic politics. In the end, though, all reinforcements are dependent upon the timely receipt of warning and the implementation of the necessary measures by the appropriate political authorities.

D. REASSURANCE

Norway has walked a fine line between prudence and appeasement since February 1949. Norway's policy has consistently been one of enlightened self-interest where Norway's security was best served by taking Soviet strategic concerns into consideration in the formation of her various policies. This policy of reassurance has consisted of a series of unilateral restrictions by which the Norwegians have attempted to reduce Soviet insecurities at having a member of a "hostile" alliance only 78 miles from the homeport of 65 per cent of its SSBN force. The Soviets have repeatedly tried to treat these restrictions as bilateral agreements but Norway has consistently reserved the right to alter these policies if Norway is attacked or exposed to threats of attack. With a common border of 122 miles, Norway has adopted measures to avoid provocation, to preclude any Soviet pretext for action, and to assure the Soviet Union that it need not fear aggression from Norwegian soil.

1. Base Policy¹¹⁵

When Norway was considering joining the proposed Western Alliance, the Soviets on 29 January 1949 sent a diplomatic note alleging that the proposed alliance had aggressive intentions and asking if Norway intended to join or "undertake any obligations ... regarding the establishment of air or naval bases on Norwegian territory." The Norwegians responded to this query with a unilateral declaration on 1 February 1949 that stated:

"Norway will never be a party to a policy with aggressive intentions. It will never permit Norwegian territory to be used in the service of a policy of this kind. The Norwegian Government will never be a party to any agreement with other states involving obligations on the part of Norway to make available to the armed forces of foreign power's bases on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or subject to the threat of attack."

The Soviets responded with a second note on 5 February 1949 which offered Norway a Non-Aggression Pact if Norway was worried about a threat from the East. Norway responded with a statement that:

"Forced by the disappointing performance of the United Nations to seek increased security through regional cooperation, it had looked into the possibilities of a northern defense union without positive result and now intended to investigate more the matter of participation in a regional security system comprising countries on the Atlantic."¹¹⁷

As for the Non-Aggression Pact. Norway countered that since both countries were members of the United Nations and pledged to refrain from wars of aggression such a pact would be superfluous.

The reasons for this policy were several. After five years of German occupation the Norwegians had no desire to have foreign troops on their soil again. Concern over Soviet security sensitivities was part of the calculus. Norway was sensitive to the Swedish fears that establishing bases for allied forces in Norway might lead to increased Soviet pressure and demands on Finland.¹¹⁸ In no doubt also had part of its origin in a desire to placate domestic critics of the proposed pact and to make the pact more acceptable.¹¹⁹

This ban on foreign bases was developed not in response to Western requests but in response to Soviet protests. In a speech to the Storting in February 1951 the Minister of Defense, Jens Christian Haugue stated:

"The Norwegian base policy does not prevent Norway from making bases available to Allied armed forces in the event of an armed attack in the North Atlantic area, or from summoning Allied forces to the country at a time when the Norwegian authorities consider themselves exposed to the threat of attack. Nor does the Norwegian base policy prevent Norway, in prescribed constitutional forms, from entering into conditional agreements with our Allies having a situation of this kind in mind.

"Our base policy cannot prevent Norway from developing her military installations in accordance with a structure which will make them capable of receiving and effectively maintaining Allied armed forces transferred in order to assist in the defense of the country.

"Our base policy cannot prevent Norway from participating in joint Allied exercises or being visited for short periods by the naval and air forces of our Allies, even in peacetime."¹²⁰

This policy has been the subject of controversy since its inception. The Soviets have consistently regarded the policy as a binding obligation and have attempted to interpret it in a highly restrictive manner, despite repeated assertions by the Norwegians that the policy is not a bilateral agreement, and that they are the only ones capable of interpreting and applying it.

In 1951, the NATO unified command structure was established and an agreement was reached to locate NATO's Northern Command (AFNORTH) at Kolsas, outside Oslo. Along with this, proposals for the stationing of Allied (American) fighters in peacetime in Norway and Denmark began to emerge in light of the growing power imbalance on the Northern Flank. In a diplomatic note of 15 October 1951 the Soviets asserted Norway was following a pattern contrary to the assurances previously given. The Norwegians reaffirmed that their participation in NATO was a purely defensive measure and directed Soviet attention to Defense Minister Hauge's speech for a better understanding of their base policy.¹²¹

Despite the support of AFNORTH and the endorsement by the government of the proposal that it accept the

peacetime stationing of American fighters in Norway, the Foreign Policy Committee of the Storting rejected it with only three of the 23 members casting favorable votes.¹²² In January 1953, Foreign Minister Lange declared the the Norwegian base policy would continue unchanged. This base policy has constituted one of the continuing elements of Norwegian security policy and has acted as a general framework of restraint in which specific guidelines have been drawn. In 1977, the Government summarized the established practice since 1951 with the following:

"Our base policy does not prevent allied forces from staying in Norway for training purposes for shorter periods or as a part of allied exercises aimed at preparing possible allied support to Norway in a situation where Norwegian authorities request that allied forces be sent to the country.

"Norwegian base policy does not prevent the establishment on Norwegian territory of installations for command, control, communication, navigation, warning, etc. for allied forces.

"The base policy is no hindrance to the establishment in Norway of stockpiles of ammunition, equipment, supplies, etc. for allied forces.

"Norwegian base policy does not prevent Norway's participation in the integrated military cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, agreements on the transfer, in the prescribed constitutional form, of command authority over Norwegian forces to allied command, establishment on Norwegian territory of allied headquarters and participation in the work of the latter, or the transfer of Norwegian air forces to allied operational command in peacetime."¹²³

Within this framework, Norway laid down rules for the management of and access to common infrastructure

installations in Norway. All such installations must be under Norwegian control and be both operated and maintained by Norwegian personnel. All depots are stocked in accordance with specific prestocking agreements and filled in accordance with NATO's Defense Plans. The installations themselves belong to Norway, but the supplies within these installations can only be redistributed, withdrawn or used elsewhere with the agreement of the Norwegian authorities. These principles were incorporated in the 1981 agreement for the prestocking of the equipment of a Marine Amphibious Brigade.

This policy is seen in operation in Norway's participation in NATO's Joint Airborne Control and Warning Force (NAEW - NATO's Airborne Early Warning or AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System). Norwegian participation was made contingent upon certain conditions. In an attachment to the NATO agreement, it was stated that Norway would have decisive influence on the operational concept in Norwegian areas of interest, that such operations would be controlled by Norwegian authorities, and that the plan of operations in the northern areas must be compatible with the Norwegian goal of maintaining a low level of tension in these areas. Orland Air Station was chosen as a forward operational point and is being prepared to receive the NAEW aircraft, to perform simple maintenance tasks and serve as a crew change point in connection with

routine tasks and exercises. All permanently assigned personnel at the air station will be Norwegian. On the average one E-3A aircraft will land and take off from the field per week.¹²⁴

The SOSUS station, the Loran-C and Omega Navigational Station, and the intelligence listening and monitoring stations are all manned by Norwegians.

2. Nuclear Weapons Policy

In 1957, at a NATO summit meeting, a codicial to Norway's ban on the stationing of foreign troops in Norway was promulgated. At this time, NATO was considering the American proposal to establish nuclear stockpiles and deploy the intermediate range Thor and Jupiter missiles in Europe.

Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin wrote a letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen warning that the Norwegian people might "have to pay dearly for the bases which are built in Norway if the NATO strategist's plans are carried out." He pointed out that NATO bases in Norway would constitute "legitimate targets" for Soviet hydrogen bombs. The veiled threats were reiterated in new letters on the eve of the December 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting.¹²⁵

The governing Labor Party in the spring of 1957 had adopted a proposal that "Nuclear weapons must not be emplaced on Norwegian territories." Thus on 16 December

1957, even before discussions concerning the emplacement of nuclear weapons had taken place, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen conducted a preemptive diplomatic strike of his own. He stated that Norway had no plans to "allow stores of nuclear weapons to be established on Norwegian territory or to install launching bases for medium range missiles."¹²⁶ Premier Bulganin wrote shortly thereafter expressing his "great satisfaction" and it was in this letter that the formation of a Northern European nuclear weapons free zone appeared.¹²⁷ The Norwegian Foreign Minister extended the reservation by adding: "Nor do we have plans to receive stores of nuclear munitions for tactical nuclear weapons in our country."

In 1960, the Military Chiefs Committee recommended that the Norwegian forces be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons for the direct defense of Norwegian territory. The emplacement was considered necessary so as to create a situation in which an adversary would be subject to the same tactical constraints the Norwegians faced and because the rapid concentration and dispersal of troops necessitated nuclear weapons be in place in peacetime.

The government in an evaluation of policy decided that nuclear munitions for battlefield weapons would not be stored on Norwegian territory in peacetime, stressing the constitutional responsibility of any Norwegian government

to assess the adequacy of these defense measure.¹²⁸ In 1961, this policy was formulated in rather stark terms: "Nuclear weapons will not be stationed on Norwegian territory."

Norwegian policy prohibits the storage and deployment of nuclear weapons. Norwegian forces do not receive training in the use of nuclear weapons, nor does Norway have any special munition sites for the storage of such weapons. Norway has no delivery systems that are certified for nuclear use and the special communications systems utilized in connection with nuclear weapons have not been installed. Norway has not concluded a Program of Cooperation (POC) Agreement with the United States. This agreement is required by Section 144b of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act in order to transfer information about nuclear operations in peacetime or the actual transfer of weapons in wartime. Within NATO only Norway, Denmark, and Luxembourg have no such agreement and in the absence of such an agreement a request for transfer of nuclear weapons must rest before the joint committee of the U.S. Congress for sixty days. Norway has deliberately refrained from undertaking any measures or concluding agreements which would facilitate a change in policy in response to attacks or threats of attacks.

Norway is willing to accept the security provided by the American "nuclear umbrella" but desires to avoid the risk associated with possession of nuclear weapons. This ambiguity is expressed in the official statement that:

"The formulation of the Norwegian nuclear weapons policy does not prevent the Norwegian defense in the event of war from being supported by external forces which may have at their disposal nuclear weapons for tactical use by their own units. As distinguished from conventional reinforcements, no preparations have been made in peacetime, however, for receiving possible allied nuclear weapons during crisis or war. Both the insertion of such reinforcements and the use of their nuclear weapons require Norwegian consent."¹²⁹

In an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten on 29 October 1982, Foreign Minister Sverre Strømstad stated that "Norway decides on her own if our country shall request assistance and maintains complete control over which weapons will be used. We have no reason to doubt that the Americans will abide by the agreement."

The interpretation of this policy has led to some confusion. In 1975, in a thesis in political science by Mayor Anders Hellebust it was claimed that United States SSBN's were utilizing the Omega and Loran Navigational Systems.¹³⁰ The controversy arose over whether Norwegian consent had been granted in light of the systems' alleged support of SSBN operations. An official investigation found no wrongdoing and the government has stressed the systems are general navigation systems with civilian purposes also. These systems could be of use to

maritime reinforcements and American SSBN's are not dependent on them. These systems are operated by Norwegian personnel and are not considered violations of Norway's policy on foreign bases or nuclear weapons. The ban on nuclear weapons has been interpreted to preclude the visit of SSBN's to Norwegian harbors and in 1980 an exercise involving F-111 bombers which can carry either conventional ordnance or atomic weapons was cancelled due to the complaints of critics that Norway might be compromising her policy on nuclear weapons.

Norway's nuclear fears also found their way into the 1981 Memorandum of Understanding concerning the prestocking of supplies and equipment for a United States Marine Amphibious Brigade. This memorandum contained the following clause:

"Norwegian policies with respect to the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian territory and the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory will not be altered by this agreement."¹³²

Norway has signed both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. By its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Norway is bound not to accept, directly or indirectly, or to gain control of nuclear warheads. Norway is also forbidden to produce or in any other way obtain or accept assistance in the production of nuclear weapons. Despite these restrictions Norway is a member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and participates in

the planning and formulation of the principles for the Allies' possible use of nuclear weapons, but without being a party to the actual control of the weapons.

Chemical weapons were added to the list of proscribed weapons in 1980.

3. Military Activities

Norway has imposed a series of constraints on routine military activities in order to emphasize their defense intentions and to reduce friction in sensitive areas. In this regard exercises normally follow a regular pattern and the Norwegians do not allow Allied land force exercises in the northeastern county of Finnmark. No allied aircraft are allowed east of the 24° East Meridian and Allied naval vessels are generally restricted from Norwegian territorial waters East of this same Meridian (the Soviet-Norwegian border is located in Finnmark roughly between 29° and 31° East).

Exercises in Norway are of limited duration. Norway goes beyond the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which required announcement of all exercises involving more than 25,000 men twenty-one days before they start. Norway announces all exercises involving 10,000 men or more thirty days before they begin and invites observers to attend all exercises involving Allied participation. Concern over Soviet sensitivities is also evident in the size of

Norwegian forces on the Soviet border. The Norwegian forces in the north cannot be considered a threat to the Soviets. These sensitivities also contributed to the decision to preposition the equipment and supplies of the United States Marine Amphibious Brigade in Trondelag rather than in the north where deployment of the U.S. Marines might be viewed as an unnecessary provocation. This is also seen in the division of labor of maritime patrol aircraft in the north. Norwegian maritime patrol aircraft patrol the Barents Sea, thus enabling NATO to avoid American patrols in an area of extreme Soviet sensitivity.¹³³

It is the concern of the Norwegians to ensure the proper mix of deterrence and reassurance so as to best guarantee Norway's independence and freedom of action with regard to the Soviet Union.

E. IMPROVEMENTS

Norway is actively engaged in improving the quality of its deterrent forces. The Air Force is in the process of converting over to a force composed entirely of F-16 aircraft. In addition, the government has undertaken to acquire a new air-to-surface missile, the PENGUIN Mark 3.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

⁸³Norwegian Defense Review Commission Abstract Chapter 21, Oslo: Defense Department Press Service, May 1978, p. 2.

⁸⁴Norwegian Report to the Storting No. 94 for 1978-79 on the Defense Review Commission's Report and the Main Guidelines for the Activity of the Defense Establishment in the Period 1979-83, abstract, Oslo: Defense Department Press Service, May, 1978, p. 132.

⁸⁵According to the Oslo Peace Research Institute there are 11 stations in Northern Norway, some as far East as Vardo and Vadso on the Varangerfjord. These stations contribute to NATO's electronic surveillance and a SOSUS line between Norway's Bear Island in the Svalbard Archipelago and shore facilities on the Finnmark coast provides locating information on Soviet submarines.

⁸⁶The use of Norwegian fjords as ice free bases for Soviet forces is not truly likely as the Soviets lack of a replenishment and repair capability precludes this. Nuclear submarines would not need to replenish as their fuel loads last for years and the demands made on bases that could handle the maintenance of weapons, radar, sonar, engineering plants, etc., would take years to establish. As sheltered anchorages for diesel submarines the fjords might have some significance. Taking possession of Norwegian arifields would shorten the trip to the Atlantic by about 300 km and extend the striking range of Soviet aircraft against NATO forces and convoys.

⁸⁷Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman has postulated that U.S. aircraft carriers might enter and operate in the Norwegian Sea in the event of hostilities. Washington Post, -29 December 1982.

⁸⁸Captain William K. Sullivan, USN, "Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank," Naval War College Review, July-August 1979, p. 29.

⁸⁹Stewart Powell, "Where Arms Buildup Vies with Neutralism," U.S. News and World Report, 15 March 1982, p. 41.

⁹⁰General Sir Anthony Farrar Hockley, CINC AF North, "Defense in the Higher Latitudes," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1981, p. 23.

⁹¹Information for this and much of the succeeding paragraphs is from Ausland, pp. 94-104 and Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, pp. 23-33. A detailed listing of individual reinforcement components can be found in R.D.M. Furlong, "The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe: Improvements Vital for NATO," International Defense Review, 6/1079, p. 908.

⁹²"Host nation support" involves the provision by the receiving country of various forms of combat support and service support to the arriving country's units. In Norway's case this will include: (1) engineering and air base support equipment; (2) 150 over snow vehicles; (3) two motor transport companies of 90 trucks each; (4) an ambulance company with 35 ambulances; (5) a refueling section; (6) general responsibility for security and maintenance of the prepositioned equipment; and (7) the means to load and transport marines to other parts of the country.

⁹³Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prostacking and Reinforcement of Norway, Washington, D.C., 16 January 1981, p. 1.

⁹⁴A comprehensive discussion of the agreement and its implications is contained in Dov S. Zakheim, "NATO's Northern Front: Developments and Prospects," Cooperation and Conflict VII.

⁹⁵A Commando Group consists of some 700 infantrymen, a light battery provided by the Royal Artillery, equipped with the new British 105 mm light gun, an independent troop of Royal Engineers and a light helicopter logistic and support unit. The combined total of British and Dutch forces is about 3,300 men including helicopter crews.

96A detailed discussion of the ACE Mobile Force and its composition, training and use is found in Major John Braisby, U.K. Army, "The ACE Mobile Force," NATO's Fifteen Nations, December 1977-January 1978, pp. 81-89.

97A discussion of the capabilities and possible composition of the Striking Fleet Atlantic can be found in John Marriott, "Fire Power of the Striking Fleet," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1978, pp. 44-46.

98The source of much of the information on Allied exercises was Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, pp. 33-36.

99German participation as part of the MAF and in exercises on Norwegian territory has been limited to about 450 men. The German units participating are a field hospital, a signal unit and six helicopters. The restriction appears to be a reflection of domestic political concerns and a desire to dispel Soviet fears of German recanchism.

100John Berg, "Norway's Vital Defense Changes," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1980, p. 50.

101Powell, p. 44.

102"Operations on the Northern Flank of NATO," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1981, p. 58.

103The problems of training, clothing, equipping and employing forces in the Arctic are discussed in: Col. John C. Scharfen, USMC(Ret), "Cold Weather Training: The Absolute Necessity," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, pp. 34-41; Charles Latour, "Reinforcement Operations in Northern Norway," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1978, pp. 34-36; and Lawrence Griswold, "The Cold Front," Sea Power, December 1972, pp. 18-24.

104David R. Griffiths, "Norway Formulating Long Range Defense Plans," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6 July 1981, p. 43.

105Rear Admiral Ray R. Brevik, R.N.N., "Assuring the Security of Reinforcements to Norway," NATO's Fifteen Nations Special Issue, February 1982, p. 67.

106Ibid, p. 68.

107Use of the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber in an anti-SLOC role is discussed in William D. O'Neil, "BACKFIRE: Long Shadow on the Sea Lanes," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1977, pp. 27-35. The area of potential threat could be greatly extended by Soviet seizure of Svalbard and its airfield.

108The priority of the anti-SLOC role to the Soviet Navy is subject to some debate but sources agree that strikes would be employed against the terminal points so as to prevent the onward movement of supplies. These points are discussed in Michael McGuire, Soviet Military Thinking, Ed. Derek Leebaret, London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers, Ltd., 1981, pp. 125-185; in Robert G. Weinland, "The Employment of the Soviet Navy in Peace and War: Some Rationales and some Rationalizations," paper prepared for workshop on Naval Arms Control, Aspen, Colorado, 7-10 August 1978; and Johan Jorgen Holst, "The Strategic Importance of the North Atlantic: Some Questions for the Future," New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, Ed. Christoph Bertram and John J. Holst, Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, 1977, pp. 169-177.

109Information for this and the succeeding paragraphs were obtained from William Highlander, "Strategic Air and Sealift for the Army," NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1983, pp. 86-88; Joseph G. Dilullo, "Sealift Reinforcement of NATO," National Defense, April 1983, pp. 44-49; Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, USN, Commander Military Sealift Command (MSC), "Sealift ... The Achilles Heel of American Mobility," Defense 82, August 1982, pp. 8-13; General Sir Peter Whiteley, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINAFNOR), "The Reinforcement of Europe," NATO's Fifteen Nations, August-September 1979, pp. 20-25; Rear Admiral

Roy Breivik, R.N.N., Inspector General, "Assuring the Security of Reinforcements to Norway," NATO's Fifteen Nations Special Issue 2/1982, pp. 66-68; Peter J. Luciano, "Sealift Capability: A Dwindling Resource," Defense Management Journal, Third Quarter 1982, pp. 2-15; and Patrick Wall, "The Third Battle of the Atlantic," Sea Power, July 1981, pp. 52-57.

110 Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability," International Security, Spring 1981, p. 140.

111 "Soviets' Buildup in North Exceeds Protection Level," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 14 September 1981, p. 11.

112 Escalation, its consequences and possible scenarios are discussed in Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 28-54.

113 Major Donald L. Mercer, U.S. Army, "Warning Time," Military Review, January 1982, p. 18.

114 Just such a situation and its results are portrayed in Leopold Labedz, "1983: How Europe Fell," Policy Review, Fall 1980, pp. 9-31.

115 The source of much of the information for the subsequent paragraphs was found in Robert K. German, "Norway and the Bear," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 55-82; Johan J. Holst, "Norway's Search for a Nord Politikk," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981, pp. 63-84; and Kristen Amundsen, Norway, NATO and the Forgotten Soviet Challenge, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1981.

116 Text in Norway and NATO, Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1982, p. 2-3.

117 Campbell, p. 535.

118Lange, Norges Vei til NATO, pp. 43-46.

119Erik Benkel, "Norges basepolitikk-nogle overvejelser i Arbeidersportiets ledelse (Norway's Base Policy: Historical Interplay Between International Security Policy and Domestic Political Needs)," Internasjonal Politikk, (3), 1977, pp. 483-494.

120Text in Norway and NATO, Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1982, p. 3.

121German, p. 62.

122Beukel, p. 7.

123Abstract of the Report of the Defense Review Commission's Report to the Storting. Report No. 94 for 1978-79 on the Main Guidelines for the Activity of the Defense Establishment in the Period 1979-83, p. 33.

124Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, pp. 21-22.

125German, pp. 62-63.

126Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, p. 36.

127German, p. 63.

128Johan Jorgen Holst, "The Nuclear Genic: Norwegian Policies and Perspectives," in Security, Order and the Bomb, ed. Johan Jorgen Holst, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972, p. 49.

¹²⁹Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the
1980's, p. 38.

¹³⁰Bjol, p. 29.

¹³¹Ausland, p. 20.

¹³²Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the
1980's, p. 28.

¹³³Ibid, p. 8.

V. SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS

A. SOVIET POLICY

Despite the appearance of Northern Europe "as one of the quietest and most secure corners of the world,"¹³⁴ it is calm only in comparison to such areas as the Southern Flank of NATO where the confrontations between Greece and Turkey have received considerable press coverage and world attention. Despite this quiet facade, the Russians and Norway have been engaged in a series of diplomatic conflicts from as far back as the 1860's over a variety of issues.¹³⁵ These issues have represented an "intersection between economic interests, security policies, jurisdiction, the protection of resources and the environment"¹³⁶ and considered vital by each nation.

The Soviet aims in the North are a reflection of both regional and global objectives. The area offers the Soviet Union a chance to expand its sphere of influence without risking a direct military confrontation with the West. Such activities would tend to improve its global military strategic position. As a by-product of its strategic and conventional military forces on the Kola Peninsula, the Soviets are ensured a role as the dominant power in Northern Europe. Their short term goal in the area is system preservation. Within this context the present

status quo is acceptable, and NATO efforts to rectify the correlation of forces in the north are viewed with grave concern. An ideal solution from the Soviet viewpoint would be for Norway to withdraw from NATO and accept a relationship similar to the one the Soviets have with Finland. Russia expects to be treated as a superpower with global interests and in the Soviet-Norwegian relationship, this implies that in Soviet eyes Norway must adjust to the Soviet superpower position since the specific Soviet interests in the northern area are so pronounced and vital. The Soviets try to ensure that Norway's defense posture does not threaten the Murmansk naval complex or Soviet access to the North Atlantic.

In attempting to influence Norwegian policy the Soviets have been unable to utilize one of their favorite instruments - the domestic communist party. The Norges Kommunistiske Parti (Norwegian Communist Party) (NKP), due to its role in the resistance during the Second World War, managed to capture 11.9 per cent of the vote and 11 of the Stortings 150 seats.¹³⁷ With the Soviet part in the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with Finland and a perception of the growing Soviet threat in the north, the NKP share of the votes fell to 5.8 per cent and no seats in the Storting. It is the actions of the Soviets themselves rather than the activities of the NKP that have resulted in

its low standing in Norwegian politics with a mere 5.4 per cent of the vote. Its historical pattern of membership in the Norwegian Storting is shown in Table III.¹³⁸

In the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet concern over Norwegian participation in NATO came to the fore. Fears concerning Norway's policy regarding the stationing of troops or nuclear weapons dominated the scene. The Soviet method was to attempt to intimidate the Norwegians and utilize the threat of force as exemplified by Soviet nuclear might in the 1950s. In the 1960s, as Soviet military might increased, the Soviets still attempted to influence Norwegians in a heavy handed manner and had shifted to demonstrations of this might in the form of exercises. The pattern of Soviet exercises is shown in Figure 9. Though in recent years the exercises on the Kola Peninsula have not included maneuvers with airborne troops or marine infantry units. It was these elements in the Soviet pattern of exercises which had caused the greatest concern.¹³⁹ Possible invasion plans are shown in Figure 10.

The Soviets have not restricted their attempts to influence Norway merely to force and the threat of its use. They have pursued their long range objective of wooing Norway from NATO patiently and persistently while applying alternate waves of threat, cajolery, and blandishment. Diplomatic pressures have been supplemented with propaganda

TABLE III

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN NORWAY'S STORTING, 1945-1981

Party	1945	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1981
Agrarian Party ^a	10	12	14	15	16	18	20	21	12	10
Anders Lange's Party ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	0	4
Christian People's Party	8	9	14	12	15	13	14	20	22	15
Commonweal Party ^c	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Conservative Party	25	23	27	29	29	31	29	29	41	54
Liberal Party	20	21	15	15	14	18	13	2	2	2
New People's Party ^d	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	0	0
Norwegian Communist Party	11	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Norwegian Labor Party	76	85	77	78	74	68	74	62	76	66
Socialist People's Party ^e	—	—	—	—	2	2	0	15	2	4
Total	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	155	155	155

^a Known as the Center Party, 1959.^b Known as the Progress Party, 1977.^c Known as New Norway, 1945-1949.^d Known as the Liberal People's Party, 1980.^e Known as the Socialist Left Party, 1975.

Source: McHale




Figure 9. Pattern of Soviet Exercises




Figure 10. Possible Invasion Plans

efforts to stimulate domestic pressure on governments. They have attempted to use the unilateral concessions of their neighbors as a means to extort still more concessions of their neighbors as a means to extort still more concessions from them.¹⁴⁰ An example may be seen in the Gray Zone Agreement, which will be discussed in a subsequent section.

In the 1970s, the disputes between Norway and the Soviet Union revolved around competing interests with respect to the pattern of jurisdiction and resource management. The discovery of oil and gas under the continental shelf in the Norwegian Sea has only served to reinforce each side's desire for a solution in its favor.

The overall objective of Norwegian foreign policy is to develop a framework for a stable order in the high North based on as low a level of tension and military competition as possible. This order is based on a balance of power and an interplay of forces. The Norwegians have attempted to place their relations with the Soviets on a business as usual basis and actively sought to encourage a policy of detente. Detente holds out the hope of improving relations between the two countries, lessening tension and resolving competing jurisdictional claims in the North. Norway's search for a viable "Nordpolitikk" is seen as an attempt to resolve the bilateral issues between the two countries. If

it is to avoid compromising Norwegian security, it must proceed with the full understanding and support of Norway's allies.

To promote Norway's policy of Nordpolitikk the government has encouraged the development of trade and cultural exchanges. A direct trade route between Norway and the Soviet Union was recently inaugurated at Starskog in South Varanger and an expansion of the harbor at Kirkenes is being contemplated.¹⁴¹ Norway has also signed an agreement to help the Soviet state company, Sudimport, prepare a master plan for oil exploration in the Barents Sea. Commercial deliveries to the project are subject to rules established by the West for trade with Eastern Bloc countries.

Norway is subject to high technology espionage just as other NATO members are. A Norwegian firm was recently approached by three foreigners who wished to purchase four submersibles capable of operating at water depths of 3,000 meters. Forty million Norwegian krone cash was offered for the submarines, but the deal collapsed when the prospective clients were informed that papers had to be signed prohibiting the re-export of the submarines to East Bloc countries. Subsequent investigation revealed the clients represented a company specializing in trade with the Soviet Union and other East Bloc countries.¹⁴²

B. SOVIET MIGHT DISPLAYED

While force has not been used to effect the course of Soviet-Norwegian relations, the display of force has been used for psychological effect. Occasional remainders of overwhelming military power and ability to strike at will are provided by sporadic overflights, occasional submarine penetration of Norwegian fjords and Soviet exercises. The Norwegians carry out approximately 150 interceptions of Soviet military aircraft, mostly bombers, over international waters per year.¹⁴³ There have been ten serious violations of Norwegian air space resulting in formal protests since 1970. Of the 226 registered reports of unidentified objects in Norwegian territorial waters over the last 14 years, 122 are classified as certain, probable or possible submarines by Norwegian military authorities.¹⁴⁴ Such incidents may serve the double purpose of stressing the inadequacy of the national defense system while testing the government's political will to react determinedly and forcefully.

Soviet surface units have deployed in the North Atlantic primarily to participate in exercises rather than for patrols. In the early post war years Soviet naval maneuvers were carried out primarily in the fleet areas of the Barents and Baltic Sea. These still constitute the main training area and are utilized on a year round basis. The exercises of the early 1950s indicated a belief that

the primary confrontation between Soviet and Western naval forces would take place north and east of the Lofoten Islands in northern Norway. From 1956 on the operational areas were extended westward. In 1963 the pattern changed, and a pattern of two major exercises, one in spring and one in autumn, has emerged. With this pattern came a change came an increase in the area of operations. This area now extends to the whole of the Norwegian Sea and occasionally into the central parts of the Atlantic. These exercises have shown the movement of the Soviet forward defense zone to the G-I-UK Gap covering the access routes to and from the Atlantic.

The Soviets conducted three major exercises in recent years that break with the annual pattern. These were SEVER in July 1968, OKEAN in April 1970 and VESNA in April 1975. These three exercises involved extensive deployment of naval forces. SEVER was geographically limited to the Barents, Norwegian and North Seas, the Northeast Atlantic and the Baltic whereas OKEAN and VESNA were worldwide centrally controlled operations. All three exercises in the light of Soviet publicity appear to have been undertaken primarily as demonstrations of Soviet naval might.¹⁴⁵

These exercises involved the deployment of forces into the Atlantic. The initial phase of actual exercise ploy appears to have taken place in the Norwegian Sea and to

have been antisubmarine warfare-oriented. The second phase involved coordinated sub-surface, surface, and air strikes against an aggressor force moving to the northeast Atlantic through the G-I-UK Gap. In addition, in exercise VESNA the Soviets seemed to exercise attacks against simulated Western reinforcements and convoys bound for Europe from North America. In support of these operations BACKFIRE bombers were flown from airfields on the Kola Peninsula. The bombers were temporarily transferred to the Northern Fleet and upon completion returned to their home bases.¹⁴⁶

In addition, the last phases of the SEVER exercise of 1968 and the OKEAN exercise of 1970 involved Soviet task forces launched from the Baltic which hugged the Norwegian coast in a move North. These task forces conducted amphibious landings on the Pechenga Peninsula. The similarity of this pattern to the German landings of 1940 was unmistakeable and left the clear message it could happen again. These amphibious forces were retained in the north and seen as a substantial increase in Soviet offensive capabilities in the north. These capabilities were practiced during the KORPATHY exercises held in the summer of 1977.

Soviet naval exercises have become an instrument of political influence and a feature of the peacetime political environment. By exercising their forces in a

frequent and visible manner they have managed to create the impression that the Soviet Union has a dominant position in the North Sea/North Atlantic area and that its legitimate defensive perimeter is now the G-I-UK Gap.¹⁴⁷ With this extension the guarantee of seaborne reinforcements to Europe is placed in question and the perception is created that Norway has already fallen behind the Soviet Union's forward defense perimeter.

C. SOVIET-NORWEGIAN INTERACTION

The first years after the war saw the failure of Norway's policy of bridgebuilding, Norway's rejection of neutrality and of a Scandinavian defense pact in favor of NATO membership. Once Norwegian membership in NATO had been realized in April 1949, Norway set out defining the full extent of her role within NATO.

Norway's prohibitions on nuclear weapons and foreign troops came about partly from domestic politics and as a response to Soviet recriminations. In 1959, a controversy arose over the creation of NATO's Baltic Approaches Command and the assignment of West German officers to the NATO staff at Kolsas. The German Navy was assigned a major role in the defense of the Baltic approaches, including portions of Southern Norway. This defense entailed the stockpiling of fuel and ammunition for use by the West German Navy.

The Soviets protested this stockpiling, contending that the establishment of supply depots for the West German Navy could be viewed as nothing other than the establishment of military bases for foreign troops. The Soviets asserted that Norway was reneging on assurances given earlier and permitting foreign bases. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko issued thinly veiled warnings of the possible consequences of Norway's actions. Despite Soviet objections, the Storting in December 1959 approved the prepositioning of supplies for the West German Navy.

On 1 May 1960 the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Urals. The subsequent investigation and the testimony of Francis Gary Powers revealed the U-2 plane was to land on the Bodo Military Airfield on completion of its flight.¹⁴⁸ This led to Premier Khrushchev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Malinovskiy issuing warnings threatening to destroy bases which other countries made available for aircraft that violated Soviet airspace. The Soviets accused the Norwegians of participating in American espionage. The Norwegians responded that they had no knowledge of American flights over Soviet territory and had never given permission for flights which violated the airspace of other countries. The Norwegians delivered a protest to the American ambassador, but the Soviets were not placated by the fact that Norway had protested to the

United States and had demanded and received American assurances of non-repetition. The Soviets continued to warn of dire consequences if the event should be repeated.

Shortly thereafter, on 1 July 1960, the Soviet Union shot down another American reconnaissance plane. This time the plane was an RB-47 shot down in the Barents Sea off the Kola Peninsula. The Russians alleged that the plane had violated their territory and that it had been told to land in Norway in case of emergency. The Soviets protested that "Norway was still being used by the U.S.A. for carrying out aggressive actions against the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁹

Norway rejected the protest and a subsequent Soviet note asserted the Norwegians had either acquiesced in assisting the RB-47 or that the Americans thought it unnecessary to request permission before landing.

Relations remained cool and it was at this point that the Soviets attempted to sway the Norwegians with the lure of a proposal that the Soviets submitted to the 16th United Nations General Assembly. This proposal called for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones but failed to gain much support.¹⁵⁰

In a speech to the Storting in October 1960, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange stated that "everyone" should understand that Norway desired to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union and all nations who wished to maintain good relations with Norway should "respect this as

fundamental Norwegian foreign policy" and that "seeking security through NATO membership was also fundamental Norwegian policy."¹⁵¹ Lange made it clear that, although Norwegian public opinion was disturbed by what had happened, the government did not feel itself to be under threat of attack from the Soviets (a clear reference to the possibility of invoking NATO aid). He did state that if the Soviet Union continued her threatening attitude, the government might be forced to reconsider its policy.¹⁵²

These crises were followed by the Finno-Soviet crisis of October-November 1961. In a note to Finland on 30 October, the Soviet Union proposed consultation under the 1948 Friendship Treaty in order to "secure the defense of both countries against the threat of a military attack from Western Germany and her Allies." The note argued that the Bonn "revanchists" were penetrating Northern Europe militarily and about to achieve the aims pursued by Hitler in World War II.¹⁵³

The two main interpretations of the note are: (1) as an expression of genuine concern over a resurgent West Germany; and (2) as an attempt to influence the upcoming Finnish presidential election in 1962. The initiative for the note had apparently come from Soviet military leaders (not its political leaders), thus reflecting a possible expansion in the influence of the military since the shooting down of the U-2 plane.

Norway was severely criticized in the note. Norway's response was calm and based on the assumption that Norway could most effectively assist her Scandinavian neighbor Finland by handling the accusations against Norway. The first response was to state on 31 October 1961 that Norway had no business answering the note for Finland but, since Norway had been attacked in the note, the defense nature of the Norwegian defense establishment was emphasized.

Norway was faced with the option of either accepting the Soviet interpretation and giving up cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany or of challenging the Soviet interpretation of the facts. The Norwegians chose the latter and rejected any Soviet right to redress the balance by moves in Finland. Norway defended her right to continue NATO membership in a manner best serving Norway's security interests as interpreted by the Norwegians themselves.

The note was viewed as an attempt to limit and circumscribe Norwegian participation in NATO. Norwegian initial responses were limited to defending the status quo rather than warning the Soviet Union of the possible consequences of continued pressure on Finland.

On 16 November 1961, the First Vice Premier of the Soviet Union, Kusnetsov called on the Finnish ambassador to insist on the proposed staff talks and asserted that events in Northern Europe had proved that the original analysis

was correct. These events were: (1) the visit of German Defense Minister Strauss to Norway; (2) NATO maneuvers in the Western part of the Baltic; and (3) the negotiations concerning the proposed NATO Baltic Approaches Command. He further asserted that the 13 November 1961 decision by the Finnish cabinet to move forward the Finnish presidential election was not a sufficient response.

President Kekkonen of Finland asserted that Finland was not asking for outside help in dealing with its Eastern neighbor, and that Finland was not accepting any added burden created by the policies of other countries. In response to the continuing pressure on Finland, Norwegian leaders added to their previous arguments and explanations warnings about the possible consequences on Norwegian security policy if pressure on Finland continued.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange told Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and First Vice Premier Mikoyan that Norway had made it a primary objective of her policy to contribute to the peace and stability of the North and expressed the hope that the balance that had been established in the North would be preserved. Gromyko expressed his agreement with the Norwegian Foreign Minister.

Simultaneously with these concerns, Defense Minister Gudmund Harlem at a speech in Copenhagen on 21 November 1961 argued that NATO had given Norway security, and efforts to press Norway to leave NATO would

not succeed. He stated that Molotov and Stalin had scared Norway into NATO, and without their help Norway might never have joined. He asserted that, contrary to threats driving Norway out of NATO, they would drive Norway more firmly into NATO.¹⁵⁴

The Defense Minister expressed his understanding of Soviet concerns but stated that he sometimes felt that the Soviets were uneasy without reason. He trusted Soviet realism to prevail and reminded the Soviets of the Norwegian attitude towards the stationing of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. The Defense Minister did not go into the nuclear question in any great length but by mentioning the issue and linking it to the hope of continued Soviet realism he gave a clear warning that Norway's nuclear policy was not immutable.

These remarks served to strengthen President Kekkonen's position in his meeting with Premier Khrushchev on 24 November at Novosibirsk. In the face of Khrushchev's reiteration of Soviet concerns, President Kekkonen warned that Finnish-Soviet consultations might "arouse a certain uneasiness and lead to a war psychosis in the Scandinavian countries" and that putting an end to Soviet insistence on military consultations "would help to decrease the necessity of war preparations not only in Finland and in Sweden, but also in the NATO member countries - Norway and Denmark."

Khrushchev accepted Kekkonen's judgement and dropped the demand for joint staff talks. Kekkonen for his part promised more Soviet-Finnish trade and to report more actively his assessment of military developments in the Baltic Sea area (the watch dog role). The true significance of the note crisis is that it appeared not to be an alteration but rather a confirmation of the status quo in the Nordic countries. It is this status quo which has come to be called the Nordic balance and will be discussed in Chapter VI.

During the 1960s a pattern of NATO biennial exercises developed. The Soviets routinely protested these exercises as aggressive, provocative, and as violations of Norway's base policy. It was during these years that debate on Norwegian membership in NATO grew. During the debate in the Storting on 13-14 June 1968 a motion that Norway withdraw from NATO was supported by only six of the Storting's 150 members.¹⁵⁵ The years 1962 through 1965 saw a series of proposals put forth by Finnish President Kekkonen concerning nuclear weapons. Some experts have postulated that Finland in this regard served as a tool of the Soviet Union in the hope of making the proposals more acceptable.¹⁵⁶

On 7 June 1968, large Soviet troop movements were reported during the night. Sunrise the next day revealed large units (as many as 50,000 men) with tanks and

artillery were positioned just 2 km from the Norwegian border with cannons aimed at the Norwegian observation post and the nearest Norwegian bridge. Additional troops were flown in for several days including part of a paratroop battalion. The 450 Norwegian soldiers went unreinforced while the Soviets conducted military maneuvers and changes of position with their tanks, artillery and air cover for five days.

As news of this demonstration spread, the government asked the news media not to play up the story and in effect to "kill it". The press complied and on 12 June 1968 the troops were withdrawn with no explanations offered by Soviet or Norwegian authorities.¹⁵⁶ When questioned some weeks later as to the why of the maneuvers, Soviet Premier Kosygin at a press conference in Stockholm answered that it was "a maneuver intended as an answer."¹⁵⁷ It has been speculated the exercise was a response to the large NATO exercises Polar Bear and Polar Express held in the spring of 1968 or as a possible warning to the West against reacting to a move elsewhere, such as that in Czechoslovakia a few weeks later. Possibly the only real effect was to make it even less likely that Norway would exercise its option to withdraw from NATO in 1969. It was extremely ill-timed as a vote on Norwegian withdrawal from NATO was held one day after the Soviet troops withdrew.

In the early and mid-1970s Norway undertook to gradually extend the normalization of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany to the area of military cooperation within the framework of NATO. Initially, West German participation consisted of about 180 German medics in NATO's 1976 exercise "ATLAS EXPRESS." This policy met criticism on both the domestic and international fronts. Memories of the German scorched earth policy of 1945 were still strong on the domestic front and on the international level both the Soviet Union and Finland complained regarding German participation.

Early in 1977, the Norwegian government announced that the West German communication group and small helicopter unit earmarked for NATO's Allied Mobile Force (AMF) and thus possible deployment to Norway in time of crisis were scheduled to participate in the 1978 AMF exercise "Arctic Express." It was anticipated that the AMF's German infantry unit would eventually be included in the AMF exercise. However, "normalization" was halted in January 1978 when it was announced that German participation had reached an "appropriate level" - i.e., without infantry participation. The halt of "normalization" was announced in January 1978 and the government denied that the decision to stop at the present level of participation represented a retreat in the face of criticism. The validity of this is subject to debate, as Finnish President

Urko Kekkonen in a fall visit to Oslo stated that "it is not a matter of indifference to Finland who Norway will cooperate with militarily" and in December 1977 Prime Minister Odvar Nordli had been subject to an extremely critical attack concerning Norway's growing military cooperation with the Federal Republic by Kosygin at an informal meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers in Helsinki.¹⁶⁰

The latter half of the 1970s saw the resurgence of Soviet attacks upon Norway's policies within NATO. As Norway opened discussions in 1977 with the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom concerning the stockpiling of equipment and supplies for reinforcements that might arrive by air, the Soviets alleged Norway was going back on its reassurance concerning the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian soil. Norway denied this and assured the Soviets it had not altered its stated policy.

A series of "mini crises"¹⁶¹ dominated Soviet-Norwegian relations in 1978. The first of these came in Svalbard (which will be discussed in a subsequent section), where two Soviet helicopters violated Norwegian administrative rules on procedure and clearance. It was one of a long series of incidents attempting to show that in regards to Soviet actions on Svalbard Norway was unable to do anything but register a complaint.

The next crisis concerned the "boat episodes," when between 27 June and 24 July 1978, there were eleven reported violations where Soviet vessels made illegal stops and anchored off the coast of Finmark. These were a clear violation of international law which allows vessels the right of innocent passage through national waters but only authorizes stopping under unusual and critical circumstances. A variety of excuses including engine trouble, crew injury and dangerous weather conditions were offered but upon investigation most of the rationales did not hold up. After a large uproar in the media it was met with a Soviet explanation which stated the ships were engaged in innocent passage, and only four of the eleven represented border violations. Soviet regrets were expressed in the case of only one episode. The Defense Chief Sverre Amre had classified these intrusions as "gunboat diplomacy" but upon receipt of the Soviet explanation the Foreign Minister proclaimed himself satisfied and warned the media against any further over-dramatization of these episodes. Prior to this crisis only seven such incidents had been reported in the 33 years since the war.

The prior seven violations had been scattered over the entire Norwegian coastline but all eleven of these new violations occurred in the Barents Sea off the Varanger and Nordkyn Peninsulas. In Gamvik, Nordkyn, the Norwegian government operates a kay listening post which serves as

the terminus of the submarine monitoring cable linking sonar stations lying on the seabed between Norway and Spitzbergen.

Following this four Norwegian journalists scheduled to cover negotiations about the controversial Grey Zone Agreement (to be discussed later) had their visas rescinded with no explanation. Svalbard again came to the fore when it was revealed on 30 August 1978 that the Soviets were in the process of erecting a large new radar station and erecting a new airstrip (which has since been completed).

The most dramatic crisis was that involving the crash of a Soviet Tupolev TU-16 Badger type aircraft (a light bomber) on the Norwegian island of Hopen. In the crash all seven crew members were killed. A possibility existed that the flight was an illegal intrusion of Norwegian airspace rather than a forced landing. Not wishing to provoke the Soviets a civilian rather than a military investigation was undertaken. Soviet authorities were invited to participate.

At the site of the crash frequent and angry protests were made by the Russians. Three Soviet fishing vessels anchored in the sea off Hopen, and a Kresta cruiser soon arrived on the scene. A decision was made to allow Soviet personnel ashore to pick up the wreckage but prior to their arrival ashore the Norwegians found the "black box" flight recorder which could reveal the flight patterns and routes

of the plane for at least thirty hours before its crash. Upon arrival on the island the Russians sealed the recorder but the chairman of the Norwegian investigation commission asserted the recorder was vital to the investigation and refused to surrender it.

Plans were made to open the box and the Soviets were invited to participate, but refused; a protest over Norway's "unfriendly action" was delivered. Deputy Defense Minister Holst's planned visit to the Soviet Union was cancelled as were the newly scheduled talks on the Grey Zone Agreement and the deliberations of the Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission.

Another mini-crisis appeared in the form of violations of the Grey Zone Agreement. The Soviets had on three recent occasions stopped and inspected British trawlers fishing in the zone with Norwegian licenses.

The box was opened on 6 October 1978 and after much delay it was leaked that "rust" had destroyed the instrument and only one hour of flight information was available from it. The Norwegian government never released any information concerning the results of the examination of the box and it was returned to the Soviets on 15 November. This line of cooperation with the Soviets produced a thaw in relations between the two countries.

D. CURRENT ISSUES

Soviet-Norwegian conflict in the 1980s has come to center around Norway's efforts to enhance her defense readiness within NATO through the prestocking of equipment and supplies for potential reinforcements and in a series of jurisdictional disputes. Despite vociferous protests by the Soviets, who claimed that the 1981 U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade prestocking agreement was a violation of Norway's ban on the stationing of foreign troops, the Norwegian government signed the agreement on 16 January 1981.

Originally the plan had been to locate the storage site in the North, but as a compromise to domestic critics of the government and in deference to Soviet sensitivities, it was decided that the storage site would be located in central Norway. The reasons were several:

- (1) it avoided the possible esclatory pressure caused by the introduction of U.S. troops to an area of high Soviet sensitivity;
- (2) increased the options for further deployment of these forces;
- (3) the equipment being further from the scene of a possible Soviet incursion is less likely to be overrun; and

(4) it allayed U.S. concerns over air lifting forces into an area where the Soviets had a significant advantage in forces and the air threat was extremely high.¹⁶²

The Soviets asserted in a February 1982 TASS commentary that among the items to be stockpiled would be "artillery systems adapted for using nuclear shells."¹⁶³ Since this issue was so sensitive, Defense Minister Anders Sjaastad issued an immediate denial in an interview to the Aftenposten on 9 February 1982, where he acknowledged that, in theory, nuclear shells could be used in the 155 millimeter howitzers which were to be stockpiled, but he reiterated earlier guarantees that there were no plans to store in Norway the equipment which would be necessary to give them that capability.¹⁶⁴

The jurisdictional disputes have centered around three issues: (1) Svalbard; (2) Barents Sea continental shelf; and (3) Grey Zones of the Barents Sea.

1. Svalbard

Svalbard is the large archipelago located between Latitude 74° and 81° North and Longitude 10° and 35° East. It consists of numerous islands of which the largest is Spitzbergen. The islands were discovered by Vikings in the early 13th century and were the subject of numerous competing claims. The Norwegians, Russians, Swedes, Germans, Danes, Dutch and the English, at

one time or another, all claimed sovereignty.¹⁶⁵

However, under international law the territory remained terra nullius, as no one country could convince the others to renounce their claims.

In Oslo in 1914 an international conference was held to resolve the "Spitzbergen" problem and a draft convention for a joint rule over Svalbard by Norway, Russia and Sweden was proposed.¹⁶⁶ With the onset of World War I, agreement was never reached and the problem of Svalbard was raised at the Versailles Peace Conference. On 9 February 1920 the Treaty of Svalbard was signed.

The signing of the treaty did not resolve all claims as the treaty awarded sovereignty over Svalbard to Norway in Article I¹⁶⁷ but the Soviet Union and Germany were not represented at the conference and thus questioned the validity of the treaty. The rights of all countries to the resources of the island were guaranteed in Article II and the rights of Soviet nationals were specifically guaranteed under Article X. This guarantee to the Soviets was required as their government was not recognized as the de jure government of the Soviet Union. Norway's de jure recognition of the Soviet government was a prerequisite to Soviet accession to the treaty. Soviet recognition of Norwegian sovereignty was confirmed in a declaration on 15 February 1924, but it was not until 7 May 1935 that the Soviet deposited their declaration of accession with the

French Foreign Ministry. Despite this. Norway had assumed full sovereignty over the island on 14 August 1925.¹⁶⁸

This Treaty "provided all signatories with equal rights to economic activity on the islands and their circum-adjacent territorial waters without discrimination."¹⁶⁹

The treaty listed those branches of economic activity to which the right of equal status applied. These were:

"maritime operations such as fishing, whaling, and sealings and industrial, mining and commercial operations."¹⁷⁰

The Norwegians had been awarded sovereignty over the islands but Article IX of the treaty restricted this right, stipulating that the islands never be used for warlike purposes, and forbade the establishment of permanent naval bases or military fortifications. The treaty also established the territorial waters of the islands as four miles.

Coal is the major resource on the island and only the Russians and Norwegians maintain a permanent presence there.¹⁷¹ Average production of coal is about 450,000 tons each for the Russians and Norwegians. The prospects for oil on the island are not high, but periodic efforts are made to locate it.¹⁷² Since "the Barents Sea continental shelf extends just beyond Svalbard there is reason to believe that significant oil and gas reserves may be located around the island."¹⁷³ The Canadians have reported discovering uranium beneath the islands frozen

tundra, but the economic feasibility of mining it has yet to be determined.

Svalbard's importance is not to be measured only in economic terms since "for the Soviet Union the local economic activity must represent a considerable loss."¹⁷⁴ Svalbard's importance stems mainly from its strategic location at the Northern end of the Barents-Norwegian gateway, its position under possible missile flight paths, its use for a possible defense against U.S. air launched cruise missiles, and to extend Soviet reach into the Atlantic against NATO's sea lanes of communication.¹⁷⁵ This potential for use in war may well reinforce the determination of both the Soviet Union and Norway (NATO) that the status quo on Svalbard not be disturbed and that the islands remain demilitarized. The seabed around the area might be utilized for weapons emplacement; however, Norway, the United States and the Soviet Union are all signatories to the 1971 treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.¹⁷⁶

The Soviets have never liked the Svalbard Treaty of 1920; but "having reluctantly accepted in they are determined to take full advantage of the small print,"¹⁷⁷ and conflict has arisen from different interpretations of the terms of the treaty and a desire on the part of the

Soviets for a change in the regime of the island. The Soviets would like to see a "condominium" arrangement whereby joint sovereignty is established over the island. This partly explains the Soviet drive from Foreign Minister V. Molotov's demand in 1944 for a treaty revision to the current disregard of Norwegian rules and regulations. Provocations such as the unauthorized building of a helicopter port and numerous other violations occur on a repetitive basis.¹⁷⁸

The Soviet Union has tried to systematically persuade Norway to accept the principle of prior Norwegian-Soviet consultations concerning any law or measure affecting Svalbard; and in 1974, the Soviets sought a joint declaration of principles and a general cooperative agreement calling for regular political consultations and the establishment of a number of concrete cooperation projects. "Norway has turned down all Soviet attempts to emphasize the importance of the two countries cooperation on Svalbard as being in conflict with the Spitzbergen treaty in that it would favor the Soviet Union at the expense of the other signatory powers."¹⁷⁹

The issue of sovereignty over the archipelago is further complicated by the dispute concerning a continental shelf in the area. The Norwegians in 1970 declared that the Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents Sea extended out to and beyond Svalbard. This in effect dismissed any

assertions that Svalbard might have a continental shelf beyond its territorial waters of four miles. The Soviets have asserted the existence of a Svalbard continental shelf of unspecified size- and maintained that the internationalization and equality elements of the treaty would apply. The Norwegians countered that the Svalbard treaty only established a non-discriminatory resource regime on the islands and within the four mile territorial waters of the archipelago and thus any shelf outside the four miles would, by the terms of the treaty, itself fall under Norwegian sovereignty.

Norway's allies have not endorsed Norway's position, as it would eliminate them from any potential riches under the contested continental shelf¹⁸⁰ and have thus reserved judgement on this issue to a later date.¹⁸¹ The situation is further complicated by Article VIII of the Treaty which limits the export tax on minerals to one per cent and stipulates that taxes or duties collected should be devoted to the territories of the archipelago and are not to exceed expenses; thus no tax surplus is possible. This situation compares very favorably to the taxes in the North Sea which run between 60 to 70 per cent.¹⁸²

It is of interest that Soviet security interests might best be served by an exclusively Norwegian development of the contested shelf rather than an

unrestrained development of the shelf by the signatories (49 to date) of the 1920 Treaty of Svalbard. As for a condominium or sharing of sovereignty and responsibility for the islands, it could not be implemented without an amendment to the Norwegian Constitution, as the act of the Storting that implemented the treaty made Svalbard a part of Norway itself and a change to the basic treaty must be approved by the treaty's signatories.

2. Barents Sea Continental Shelf

Norway and the Soviet Union have been negotiating about the line of demarcation between their respective continental shelves in the Barents Sea since 1970. Both countries have agreed that the ultimate solution must be based on the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 to which both countries are signatories. The Soviets ratified the agreement on 20 October 1960 but the Norwegians refrained from ratifying the agreement until 9 September 1971.¹⁸³ This convention states:

"1. Where the continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be determined by an agreement between them. In the absence of agreement and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the base lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.

"2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent states, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of such agreement and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the base line from which the territorial sea of each state is measured."¹⁸⁴

These principles were replaced in the subsequent Law of the Sea Treaty in Article 83 which states:

"1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent or opposite states shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances."

The new text leaves the demarcation of the continental shelf still subject to agreements between states and this demarcation is to be performed while taking due account of all relevant special circumstances.

In interpreting the clauses of the 1958 convention the International Court of Justice in 1969 ruled that:

"...neither the effect of the Geneva convention nor of the state practice since its signing justified the inference that delimitation according to the principle of equidistance rises to the level of a mandatory rule of customary law."¹⁸⁵

The abandoning of all mention of the equidistant principle from the new treaty supports this position.

The International Court found in 1969 that neither the equidistance method nor any other method of delimitation was obligatory. The court stressed that such delimitation should have as a basis the following legal principles:

"...that delimitation must be the object of the agreement between the states concerned and that such agreements must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles."¹⁸⁶

Thus Norway and the Soviet Union must agree on the final delimitation between them and this need for agreement has led to each side taking a different interpretation of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.

The Norwegians have held that the median line principle should be used for the delimitation of the Barents Sea's continental shelf. The technical definition of a median line is a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two coastal states is measured. Thus the Norwegian median line would proceed north from the boundary of each country's territorial waters to a point halfway between Svalbard and Soviet Novaya Zemlja (see Figure 11).

The Soviet Union has consistently maintained that the continental shelf in the Barents Sea must be divided on the basis of the sector principle. By this method a line is drawn directly from the point where the international




Figure 11. Territorial Waters

(mainland) border meets the sea to the North Pole.¹⁸⁹


This position is partly influenced by a decree promulgated in 1926 which first formulated the Soviet sector claim when it stated:

"All lands and islands both discovered and which may be discovered in the future, which do not comprise at the time of publication the territory of any foreign state recognized by the Government of the USSR, located in the Northern Arctic Oceans, north of the shores of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics up to the North Pole...are proclaimed to be the territory of the USSR."¹⁸⁸

This decree makes no claim to the area beneath the sea but has been used to further assert the Soviet position regarding its "sector claim".

"In those areas where Soviet territorial waters adjoin those of a neighboring state, the maritime lateral state boundary is established by agreements concluded with those countries." The Norwegians and the Soviets concluded such an agreement on 15 February 1957. At this time Norway had territorial waters of four miles while the Soviet Union had territorial waters of 12 miles. The agreement allowed for a future extension of Norway's territorial waters to 12 miles but if Figure 12 is studied closely AC is the actual median line while AB is the agreed upon border thus giving the Soviets area ABC for future use.¹⁹⁰

The Soviets hold that the sector principle applies beyond the 12 mile territorial limit.¹⁹¹ This dispute



- Norwegian Straight Baseline
- Limit to Norwegian and Soviet Territorial Waters
- Norwegian-Soviet Land Boundary
- .-.- Norwegian-Soviet Offshore Boundary
- Limit to Future Territorial Claims
- .-.- Median Line Between Twelve-Mile Territorial Seas

Figure 12. Soviet-Norwegian 4/12 Mile Border Agreements

over application of the Norwegian median line or the Soviet sector principle concerns an area of 155,000 sq km and is larger than the entire Norwegian continental shelf in the North Sea.¹⁹² The Soviets hold that the Geneva Convention allowed for another boundary line other than the median line when it was "...justified by special circumstances." The Soviet position is that "the size of the population on the Kola Peninsula and its economic significance compared with that of Northern Norway, plus the military-strategic importance of the Kola base structure"¹⁹³ constitute "special circumstances", justifying a dividing line much further west than the median line. The International Court of Justice in 1969 ruled that special circumstances included the configuration of the coasts, the physical and geological structure and natural resources of the continental shelf and a reasonable degree of proportionality.¹⁹⁴ A further consideration has been accepted - i.e., investment (e.g., oil rigs) which has been made in the disputed area. This might well be the motive for the commencement of Soviet oil drilling 1.5 miles west of the disputed median line in the Barents Sea.¹⁹⁵ The Norwegian Royal decree issued on 1 May 1963 establishing Norwegian control over Norway's offshore subsea resources makes no allowance for special circumstances and is made "...irrespective of any other

territorial limits at sea, but not beyond the median line in relation to other states."¹⁹⁶

The Soviet claims of "special circumstances" based on its sector principle does not appear to meet the requirements previously laid down by the International Court of Justice in its previous decisions and is of dubious international standing, with only Canada and the Soviet Union advocating its applicability to the Arctic.¹⁹⁷

3. Grey Zones of the Barents Sea

The North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea represent some of the world's richest fishing areas and for many years more than 20 per cent of the world's catch originated in this region.¹⁹⁸ The exploitation was not in proportion to the size of the stocks and over-exploitation occurred. This became apparent to the Soviets and Norwegians in the early 1970s, particularly in regard to Arctic Cod. It became evident that "arrangements for fisheries management could not await the resolution of the related Barents Sea continental shelf issue."¹⁹⁹

In late 1976 Norway declared a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Soviet Union declared a 200 mile Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ). Norway and the Soviet Union had previously agreed on mutual access, total catches and on quotas within their waters out to 200 miles but the problem of inspection and enforcement rights with regard to third parties (e.g., EEC vessels) within the

disputed area was now raised. Bilateral negotiations were entered into concerning the overlapping Soviet and Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction claims (see Figure 13). In June 1977 a temporary Soviet-Norwegian fisheries management agreement was reached.

This agreement has come to be called the "Grey Zone" agreement and became effective in January 1978. In order to obtain agreement, the Norwegian negotiators agreed to joint enforcement within the disputed or "Grey Area." Each state has jurisdiction over its own vessels and those of third countries licensed by it. The Grey Zone established by the agreement not only covered the disputed area but also encompassed an area of 23,000 sq km (8,000 sq miles) west of the sector line and an area of 3,000 sq km (1,200 sq miles) east of the median line.²⁰⁰ Over 30 per cent of the Grey Zone lies West of the sector line (an area of formerly unambiguous Norwegian control and sovereignty).

The Grey Zone represents a temporary agreement that has been renewed each year as it has expired with the latest extension being signed on 24 June 1983 for another year. These agreements have been the subject of more political controversy (over the definition of the area or zone) than the actual content of the agreement.²⁰¹ Norway has actively sought to separate the immediate need for joint fisheries management from the delimitation issue




Figure 13. Svalbard Zones of Contention

and maintains that the agreement would not prejudice either side's position regarding jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The Norwegians believe that it is more important for the Barents Sea Cod and Capelin total catch and quotas to be determined, than it is to determine whether the quotas are caught within Norwegian or Soviet jurisdiction.²⁰²

E. NEGOTIATIONS

Discussions over these and other issues have been on going since 1970, when informal talks were opened. Formal talks commenced in 1974 and the only agreement that Norway and the Soviet Union have reached was the agreement creating the Grey Zone, which is an agreement to disagree (as neither side holds the agreement to effect their competing claims over the continental shelf). Norway has sought to prevent negotiations on one issue from having an effect on negotiations on another issue. Norway's position is further complicated by on going negotiations with other countries. This is evident in Norwegian fears that concessions over Jan Mayen might encourage Soviet expectations of similar gains in the Barents Sea.²⁰³ In addition, a conflict over resources between allies could lead to a weakening of alliance ties between members of NATO.²⁰⁴

With the commencement of exploratory drilling in the Barents Sea by the Soviet Union and as further development

in this area proceeds, the unresolved issues between Norway and the Soviet Union could serve as a source of increasing conflict. "As the exploitation of resources preoccupies nations more it may influence public attitudes to security."²⁰⁵ Norwegian appreciation of Soviet insecurities and efforts to reach agreements on urgent resources management problems with Moscow might entail a possible encouragement of Soviet pressures for a more comprehensive condominium-type economic arrangement for the Barents Sea and a precedent could be set in Norwegian-Soviet relations in that the Norwegian authorities might be tempted to seek some kind of compromise with the Soviet Union within an emerging bilateral framework which could complicate Norway's position and in effect limit her role within the multilateral security framework of NATO.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

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135The earliest conflicts involved Norwegian fishing vessels off the Murmansk coast where the Norwegians complained of mistreatment while seeking shelter on the Russian coast. these actions led the Governor of Murmansk to forbid the Norwegians fishing "near the Russian coast" in 1866. This and other incidents are well documented in William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 28-45.

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137In the vote in the Storting concerning NATO membership on 3 March 1949, 11 of the 13 negative votes were from the NKP.

138The brief resurgence in the Storting in 1953 and 1957 was the result of electoral law changes which allowed the NKP to recapture several seats. In 1973 the NKP joined the Socialist Electoral Alliance (an alliance of three small socialist parties from which the Communists withdrew in 1975) and a prominent Communist won a seat as part of the Alliance's delegation of 16. Rigures and a thorough discussion of Norwegian parties and politics are contained in Vincent E. McHale, Ed., Political Parties of Europe: Albania to Norway, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983, pp. 676-700.

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Strategic Institute, 1978; David R. Griffith, "Norway Formulating Long Range Defense Plans," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6 July 1981, pp. 42-48; John Berg, "Norway's Vital Defense Changes," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1980, pp. 49-59; Kenneth A. Myers, North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank?, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979; John Auland, Norge og en Tredje Verdenskrig (Norway and a Third World War), Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983; and R.D.M. Furlong, "The Threat to Northern Europe," International Defense Review, 4/1979, pp. 518-524.

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147 Robert G. Weinland, "War and Peace in the North: Some Political Implications of the Changing Military Situation in Northern Europe," paper presented at the Conference on the Nordic Balance in Perspective: The

Changing Military and Political Situation, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 15-16 June 1978.

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149 Norwegian texts of these diplomatic exchanges are in Johan Jorgen Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv (Norwegian Security Policy in a Strategic Perspective), Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1967, Vol. 2, pp. 151-156, quote in German, Norway and the Bear, p. 65.

150 Viktor Levin, "Na Important and Useful Initiative," A Nuclear Free Zone and Nordic Security, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1975, p. 40.

151 German, p. 66.

152 Ronald G. Popperwell, Norway, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, p. 183.

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155 Popperwell, p. 181.

156The entire event is described in Kirsten Amundsen, Norway, NATO and the Forgotten Soviet Challenge, Policy Papers International Affairs, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981, pp. 36-37.

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168Greve, p. 27.

169Olive Archer and David Serivener, "Frozen Frontiers and Resource Wrangles: Conflict and Cooperation in Northern Waters," International Affairs, 1983, p. 72.

170Greve, p. 51.

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174Thomas Reis, "Svalbard, Flashpoint for the Far North," International Defense Review, March 1980, p. 336.

175These and other possible wartime uses are discussed in Thomas Reis, "Svalbard, Flashpoint of the Far North," (see Footnote 174) and in Kim Traavik and Willy Ostreng, "Security and Ocean Law: Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1977, pp. 343-367.

176The text of this treaty is contained in Appendix I of Lawrence Juda, Ocean Space Rights, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 197-201. It

should be noted that Article II of this treaty identifies a twelve mile seabed zone to which the terms of the treaty do "not apply to the coastal state or the seabed beneath its territorial waters." Thus emplacement is allowed provided it is done by or with the consent of the coastal state and within its territorial waters which are not allowed to exceed twelve miles. In Norway's case such emplacement is nearly impossible to imagine in light of her restriction on nuclear weapons in her territory.

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178These and other violations are documented in German, pp. 55-82 and Amundsen, pp. 15-19.

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184Text quoted in Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford, Oscar Schacter, and Hans Smit, International Law Cases and Materials, St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1980, p. 365.

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187Myers, p. 49.

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191Erling Bjäl, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper 181, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, p. 29.

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197Synhorst, p. 100.

198Willy Ostreng, "Norway's Law of the Sea Policy in the 1970's," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. II, No. 1/2, 1982, p. 76.

199Archer, p. 71.

200Amundsen.

201Johan Jorgen Holst, "Norway's Search for a NORD Politikk," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981, p. 80.

202Traavik, p. 360.

203A thorough discussion of Norway's ongoing negotiations is contained in Clive Archer and David Scrivener's "Foreign Frontiers and Resource Wrangles: Conflict and Cooperation in Northern Waters," International Affairs, 1983, pp. 59-76.

204This unfortunate situation came to pass with the "Cod War" between the United Kingdom and Iceland in 1973 and though this situation was finally resolved and the potential for conflict over the resources of the North Atlantic, both mineral and living resources still exists.

205Anders C. Sjaastad and John Kristen Skogan, "The Strategic Environment of the North Atlantic and Perspectives of the Littoral States," Ed. Christoph Bertram and Johan Jorgen Holst, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977, p. 28.

VI. NORDIC BALANCE AND DEFENSE COMMITMENT

A. NORDIC BALANCE

The idea of a Nordic Balance²⁰⁶ has been often cited as contributing to stability in Northern Europe. In truth the Nordic balance represents an ex post facto rationalization of past political decisions rather than the conscious pursuit of a predetermined objective. It is no more than the recognition of the stability of the geopolitical situation of the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland). This stability is reflected in the relations among themselves and the two superpowers.²⁰⁷

Each country's security policy is viewed in the light of its neighbors. This balance has been created in a situation where the goal of the two superpowers in the area has been one of denial to the opponent rather than possession. The present alignment of the Nordic countries gives both the superpowers a reasonable defense assurance.

The concept of a Nordic balance has three main qualities: (1) it exists in a bi-polar world; (2) the Nordic system is a subset of the global system; and (3) the system represents an interplay between global and local interests and forces. Thus each country's security policy

is viewed in the light of its interaction and effects on its neighbors. Developments in one country can have serious consequences within the others.

The political orientation of the four countries varies from Norway and Denmark's alliance in NATO with the Western powers to Sweden's armed neutrality and thence to Finland's neutrality coupled with her special relationship with the Soviet Union. In partial regard to the nearness of and the vital and strategic interest that the Soviets have in the area, both Denmark and Norway have placed unilateral restrictions regarding bases²⁰⁸ and nuclear weapons on their participation in NATO so as to demonstrate the purely defensive nature of their actions. As part of Norway's policy of balancing deterrence and reassurance Norway has reserved the right to interpret and change its unilateral bans as it sees fit. The bans were made on the condition that Norway not be attacked or threatened by attack.

Sweden assumed an unconditional position of neutrality. Its armed forces were sufficient strength to deter an aggressor by the fact that conquest of Sweden would be sufficiently difficult that costs would outweigh any possible gains. Norwegian Defense Minister Jens Christian Hauge asserted that Sweden's position of neutrality was of value to Norway as it muted Soviet misapprehensions about the North Atlantic Treaty.²⁰⁹ Even militarily Sweden's stance was of value because Sweden was well armed and thus

any possible aggressor attempting to cross Swedish territory to strike at Norway might expect stiff Swedish resistance to the use of its territory.

Finland's official status is one of neutrality but Finland does have certain limitations placed on it by the World War II peace treaty signed in 1947 with the Allied and Associated Powers (Russia, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa). The treaty limits the Finnish armed forces to 42,500 men and prohibits nuclear weapons, guided missiles, submarines, motor torpedo boats and bombers. It has been interpreted to permit defensive surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles.²¹⁰ On 28 April 1948 Finland concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union which in Article IV pledged Finland "...not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition directed against the Soviet Union."²¹¹ This enhanced the position of Finnish neutrality, as it made it more credible in Soviet eyes. In addition the treaty established that Finland promised to defend her territory against "Germany or any other state allied with her," if aggression were aimed against Finland or the Soviet Union. A separate clause provided for mutual consultation "if it is established that the threat of an armed attack is present"²¹² and to

accept Soviet aid. Finland in the treaty did not have to accept responsibility for actions outside her own territory.²¹³

The interaction of these security policies is what has come to be the fulcrum around which the mutual restraint of the superpowers has come to function. The most explicit use of the Nordic balance doctrine took place during the Finnish-Soviet "note crisis" of October/November 1961. This crisis was described in Chapter V and revealed the workings of the "balance."

In the case of Sweden, when discussions of a change in Swedish neutrality as a possible response to Soviet pressure on Finland was brought up, the Prime Minister declared that Swedish neutrality could not be shifted back and forth according to the vicissitudes of international affairs and that the policy could not be given varying interpretations in order to serve foreign interests. Such interpretations would undermine the credibility of Swedish neutrality.²¹⁴ Swedish foreign policy had two aims. One was to maintain her neutrality and the second was not to take measures that would harm Finland's interests.

The Norwegian statements regarding possible changes in defense policies in response to Soviet pressure on Finland were a double-edged sword. A Norwegian willingness to adjust her security policies could also be interpreted as a willingness on Norway's part to limit her freedom of

action. If Norway were to condition her non-use of her policy option on the condition of good Soviet behavior toward Finland, then the Soviets could reverse the situation by arguing that exercise of the Norwegian options for other purposes or in different circumstances would give the Soviets a justification for moves against Finland, thus placing the blame on Norway. This would increase inhibitions against Norwegian actions under other situations.

If Norway chose to exercise her option of accepting foreign troops or nuclear weapons, it could not be used a second time. Its main value is in its non-exercise and thus maintaining a low level of tension in Northern Europe. In addition, over the years, these policies have become nearly sacrosanct and short of an actual invasion it is almost impossible to envision a change in this aspect of reassurance. "The theory of a Nordic balance thus leaves the impression of a fairly stable system of regional security based on four countries pursuing a policy of calculated weakness"²¹⁵ as regards the Soviet Union. The balance is likely to be more effective as a description of normal times than it would be in efforts to restore the "balance" in a time of crisis.

B. NORWAY'S COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE AND NATO

In the years from 1973 to 1982 there has been a steady increase in the belief that Norway should maintain a

military establishment (see Table III). Along with this increase in support of the military defense establishment the proportion of NATO supporters increased from 75 per cent in 1965 to 89 per cent in 1977 (see Table IV).²¹⁶

Norwegian support for NATO does not necessarily translate into unqualified support for all NATO policies. Norway has officially supported NATO's 1979 two-track decision concerning the deployment of the Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to Europe beginning in December 1983. This support for the NATO deployment has not been total throughout the population and has been the subject of a major controversy. The Labour Party's national executive agreed on a strategy aimed at avoiding the deployment of the missiles²¹⁷ and at the national Congress in Oslo on 22-24 April a unanimous resolution was adopted. This resolution had as its goal the reduction of missiles in Eastern Europe and no deployment in the West. The existing proposals set forth by the United States and the Soviet Union were classified as insufficient. According to the resolution no deployment of missiles was to take place while the talks are in progress. In an attempt to express their disapproval the Labor Party attempted to cut off Norway's contribution to the common infrastructure costs of deployment (a small

TABLE III

SHOULD NORWAY MAINTAIN A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT?

Question:	"Do you consider that Norway should maintain a military defense establishment in the present situation?"											
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982		
YES	75	79	75	79	79	79	84	86	80	86		
NO	10	7	6	5	7	6	6	4	6	6		
UNCERTAIN	8	9	11	9	8	10	7	5	6	3		
DON'T KNOW	7	5	8	8	6	5	4	6	8	5		
TOTAL	1635	1539	1659	1599	1675	1657	1709	1437	1376	1404		

TABLE IV

SHOULD NORWAY CONTINUE TO BE A MEMBER OF NATO?

Question: "Let us consider the question whether Norway should continue to be a member of NATO (the Atlantic Treaty) or whether the membership should be terminated. Is this a question on which you have an opinion?" (if YES) "Many people consider that we should hold on to the NATO alliance, while others think that our membership should be discontinued. What is your opinion?"

	1965	1969	1973	1977
CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP	44	56	67	66
DISCONTINUED MEMBERSHIP	15	13	9	8
DON'T KNOW	41	33	24	26
OF THOSE WITH AN OPINION:				
CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP	75	79	86	89
DISCONTINUED MEMBERSHIP	25	21	14	11
TOTAL	1623	1595	1225	1730

amount of about 7 million dollars). Their efforts failed by one vote in November 1983.

The question of "burden sharing" should be reexamined here as Norway was willing to share the "burden" of the decision to pay for and deploy the missiles, but Norway was unwilling to have the missiles deployed onto Norwegian territory. Norway was willing to help buy the umbrella of NATO atomic protection and shelter beneath it but unwilling to help hold it. This contradiction was based on Norway's long standing ban on nuclear weapons and Norway's fears concerning its involvement in vertical or horizontal escalation.

Vertical escalation may be said to consist of at least four phases. The first phase involves using diplomacy, psychological tactics, economic means, military help and demonstrations to counter aggression. The second phase is conventional defense and the third phase involves the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The last phase is all out atomic war. The fear of the Norwegians here is that they do not have control of the "escalation ladder" and thus efforts may escalate without sufficient effort being employed to resolve a crisis at the first "rung" of the ladder.

Horizontal escalation is a fear that conflict in one geographical area will spread to others. This is most easily shown by the use of the Carter doctrine. It was

feared that encroachments in the Middle East (after Afghanistan) would be met by efforts in other areas. This was expressed in 1980 by the then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that the Soviet Union might expect repercussions "as far north as Norway" in response to further incursions into the Middle East. Such statements only increased Norwegian fears.²¹⁸

Efforts to establish a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe have been around since it was first proposed in letters to the Nordic chiefs of government by Soviet Premier Bulganin in January 1958. Norway has never accepted the proposals but at the same time Norway has never totally rejected the proposal. In evaluating the proposal Norway suggested certain themes and conditions:

- (1) Norway was interested in maintaining the equilibrium in Northern Europe and hence unwilling to enter into obligations which would weaken the links to the rest of Europe.
- (2) A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the north should be part of more comprehensive negotiations about arms control and disarmament.
- (3) A NWFZ should be part of a broader arrangement in Europe in order to prevent decoupling and isolation.
- (4) Some limits must be imposed on Soviet nuclear weapons in close proximity to the Nordic area.

Norway has remained concerned about not entering into arrangements which would weaken links to NATO and alliance strategy for the common defense.²¹⁹

The Nordic countries at the present moment do in fact constitute a nuclear free zone. All four are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in addition Finland is forbidden nuclear weapons by its peace treaty with the Allies at the end of World War II. Both Norway and Denmark have established unilateral bans on nuclear weapons within their territory. Thus to change to a formal ratification and binding agreement the proposal would have to offer more than a mere ratification of the status quo.

The only country with nuclear weapons in the north is the Soviet Union. While various proposals have been made, the Soviets have made clear that no part of the Soviet Union could be made part of a nuclear free zone. The Soviets have offered to take "unspecified measures," but given the range of today's weapons and technological change, it "does not appear likely that any such zone could constitute any real guarantee for the security of the Nordic countries."²²⁰

It is interesting to note that on 27 October 1981 the Soviet diesel-powered WHISKEY Class submarine, Number 137, ran aground in Sweden territorial waters and that measurements of radiation indicated the presence of nuclear torpedos aboard the unit. The significance of this event

to the drive for a nuclear free zone was that it drove home the relevance of concern over Soviet systems. It came as no surprise that the Soviets had nuclear torpedos but that "such weapons would be deployed on so obsolete a vessel (built in the 1950's), in the Baltic and on a submarine that was sent deep into Swedish territorial waters on a hazardous escapade."²²¹ The net result of this incident was to further convince Norway, Denmark and Sweden that any nuclear free zone in the north would have to include the Soviet Union and "must be conditional on reductions in the amount of nuclear weapons in areas adjacent to and reductions in the number of nuclear weapons targeted on the Nordic area."²²²

Within Norway the issue has a high degree of emotional appeal and is championed by the Labor Party and the group "No-to-Nuclear-Weapons." This group collected 540,268 signatures to a petition that stated:

"We ask the Storting to decide that the use of nuclear weapons on or from Norwegian territory will not be permitted, and we urge the Government to work actively to establish by treaty a nuclear weapon-free zone which comprises Norway, Denmark and Finland."²²²

The signatures represented nearly one-eighth of the Norwegian population of four million.

C. DEFENSE SUPPORT

The Norwegian Defense effort has been consistent and defense efforts have consistently constituted around three

per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) (see Table V). The defense forces of the country account for three per cent of Norwegian employment. Wages account for more than 40 per cent of total expenditures for defense while the investments in materiel have been around 20 per cent (see Table VI).

Investments have concentrated on the air force for the purchase of 72 F-16 aircraft. The Air Force has accounted for 77 per cent of materiel investment, the Navy eight per cent and the Army 14 per cent. The F-16 purchase program is drawing to a close but the Navy will be acquiring a new generation of submarines. Defense studies, though, have indicated that investment priority should favor the Army. The Defense Commission of 1974 recommended a new structure for the Army's brigades. The new structure was termed Brigade 90 and involved higher mobility, firepower and air defense. In addition, three brigades would be converted to Brigade 90 PF with an armored battalion replacing one of the three infantry battalions within a brigade.²²³

With the world wide recession, Norway's economy has been extremely hard hit and Norway's ability to continue its defense effort has been severely hampered. As Defense Minister Ander C. Sjaastad noted in a speech on 29 April 1983, Norway can not live up to the budget recommendations advanced previously. It had been

TABLE V

NORWEGIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 1973-83:
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE COSTS AND INVESTMENTS (IN PER CENT)

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Operations and Maintenance (O+M)	77.8	78.6	80.3	79.3	78.9	76.1	74.2	73.7	73.7	71.6	72.4
Investments	22.1	21.4	19.7	20.7	21.1	23.9	25.8	26.3	26.3	28.4	27.6

TABLE VI

NORWEGIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 1973-83:
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN WAGES AND MATERIEL
(IN PER CENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES)

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Wages	46.7	45.8	48.2	48.8	47.0	45.4	44.0	42.9	42.3	41.6	42.8
Materiel Investments	18.4	15.6	14.2	15.6	16.5	19.3	20.3	20.8	20.4	21.4	19.6
O+M	22.0	22.8	21.6	20.3	20.9	19.7	19.9	19.9	20.2	19.0	18.5

postulated that the Norwegian expenditure as a percentage of GNP would rise to four per cent and it was stated by the Chief of Defense in testimony before the Defense Commission this was 0.5 per cent too low.

The disparity between funds and goals has led to the following economic measures:²²⁴

- (1) The Brigade 90 and 90 PF program has been slowed. It will not commence until the 1984-85 period and then be limited to the Northern brigade first.
- (2) The material condition of the Navy will remain to a large extent unchanged in the period 1984-88. This represents a lengthening of the effective operating life of both ships and coastal defense beyond that normally planned on.
- (3) For the Air Force, a search is in progress for a means of reducing operating expenses.
- (4) A consolidation of training schools and changes in the administration of the officer training program.

The impact of budget shortfalls will be felt in the operations and structure of Norwegian forces for several years.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

²⁰⁶The first introduction of the concept of the "Nordic Balance" to the Norwegian community of scholars was made by the foreign editor of the Bergens Tidene (Gergen Times) newspaper, Mr. Tomas Toravik, in an article in the oldest Norwegian political journal Samtiden, No. 2/1962. The first significant treatment of the subject in English was made by Mr. Richard J. Kerry writing in the 1963 Autumn issue of International Organization under the title "Norway and Collective Defense Organization."

²⁰⁷Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper No. 81, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 9.

²⁰⁸Norway's ban on bases is in the form of a note sent to the Soviets while Denmark has no basis in diplomatic correspondence and appears to have been decided after membership. The Norwegian decision appears to have been made with regard to Soviet concerns rather than in regard to Finland's position.

²⁰⁹Olav Bruntland, "The Nordic Balance: Past and Present," Cooperation and Conflict, 2, 1966, p. 38.

²¹⁰Colonel Albert Leo Romaneski, U.S. Army, "Nordic Balance in the 1970's," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1973, p. 34.

²¹¹Ibid, p. 36.

²¹²T.K. Derry, A History of Scandinavia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, p. 359.

²¹³Franklin D. Scott, Scandinavia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 251.

²¹⁴Bruntland, p. 42.

215Nils Orvik and Niels J. Haagerup, The Scandinavian Members of NATO, Adelphi Paper No. 23, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1965, p. 7.

216It should be noted that the percentage of uncommitted people in 1965 was 41 per cent but by 1977 had fallen to a level of only 26 per cent. This is still a significant proportion representing nearly one-fourth of the population. It seems to be a rather high proportion of uncommitteds considering Norway's being on the front line and sharing a border with the Soviet Union.

217"Labor Party Formulates Disarmament Strategy," News of Norway, 25 February 1983, p. 14.

218John Ausland, Norge og en Tredje Verdenskrig (Norway and a Third World War), Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982, p. 23.

219Johan Jorgen Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, Oslo: Norsk Utemrikspolitisk Institutt, 1982, pp. 46-47.

220Erling Bjal, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper No. 181, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, p. 25.

221Milton Leitenberg, "The Stranded U.S.S.R. Submarine in Sweden and the Question of a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XVII, 1982, p. 21.

222Holst, Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's, p. 52.

223Ibid, p. 59.

224Anders C. Sjaastad Speech on 29 April 1983 to Norwegian Defense College, Oslo, Norway.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PROBLEMS

In examining Norway's transition from neutrality to alliance. Norway's forces in relation to the Soviet forces arrayed against them, the avowed Norwegian security policy of reassurance and deterrence, the Nordic balance and Norway's defense commitment, and the pattern of Soviet-Norwegian relations since World War II, one is reminded of Johan Holst's observation that Norway's NATO membership is more "a marriage of convenience rather than one based on passion." In this regard the guarantee inherent in alliance membership is a political guarantee. It serves as a long-term insurance policy against harassment, intimidation, and attack.²²⁵

In examining Norwegian security policy one comes to fear that both NATO and Norway are suffering from wearing "blinders" and maintaining the appearance of calm on the Northern Flank at the cost of only seeing those items they wish to see.

One of the basic tenets has been that, given sufficient warning time, NATO and Norway can respond in a sufficient manner to deter any Soviet aggression. This raises the question of what is sufficient warning time. In 1970-1972 General Sir Walter Walker as head of NATO's Northern Command spoke out publicly about the defensibility of both

Norway and Denmark. A tremendous furor was raised and since this warnings of twelve years ago problems such as air station defenses remain unresolved.²²⁶ Norway has decided to purchase the new improved Hawk missile batteries but these systems are still not yet in place.

Norwegian forces are incapable of defeating those forces most likely to be employed against them that are presently deployed on the Kola Peninsula. Norway is thus dependent upon reinforcements. The ability of NATO to reinforce in time of crisis is dependent upon a number of factors. The first factor is that reinforcements do not occur in response to a specific Soviet action. These reinforcements must be requested by Norwegian authorities. This request may not be readily forthcoming, as the temptation might be to wait and see what happens, as in 1968, rather than to risk a possible escalation of tension.

A request to NATO for reinforcements would require a unanimity of opinion to give a NATO response. This may not be readily forthcoming for a variety of reasons. Fear of escalation, a possible disagreement over the meaning of Soviet actions or the best way to counter them, or a conflict between members over other issues such as the British-Iceland Cod wars might all inhibit agreement. This might well be circumvented by the action of individual countries.

What could not be avoided is that reinforcements would of necessity come by sea or air. This effort would require the utilization of a large number of planes or ships. These may not be readily available on short notice. Even with prior planning a scarcity of resources may inhibit operations, as seen by the fact in 1976 during exercise Mainspring, chartered Norwegian commercially-owned ferries had to be used to move a number of troops from Britain to Norway.²²⁷

Even if the resources were available, would the facilities be available to receive them? Norway's ability to provide defense for its airfields is highly suspect and at most airfields consist of obsolete L-60 artillery without an all weather capability.²²⁸ This raises the question as to whether these fields would be available or capable of receiving reinforcements in time of crisis. As for reinforcement by sea the growing Soviet naval capabilities in the North place the NATO ability to reinforce in question. Problems with acquiring the ships to move the men, equipment and supplies exist. The Soviets have the ability to interdict supplies by conducting strikes against the port terminals and with Norway's poor land communication system the onward movement of supplies is questionable.

Another area of concern is the lack of recognition on both the part of NATO and Norway to the risk of Soviet use of chemical weapons. This is seen in the lack of mention

of this threat in the 1982 NATO report Facts and Figures, NATO and Warsaw Pact - A Force Comparison. The Soviets have a large arsenal of chemical weapons and are regularly trained in NBC warfare and protection.²²⁹

The downturn in Norway's economy has severely affected the defense forces and the cutbacks and failures to purchase needed equipment affect the force composition and capabilities of tomorrow. The most severe deficiency in this regard is that Norway does not have the money to buy replacements for the F-16 aircraft which are lost in accidents. Air Force Inspector Major General Magne Sorenesen has estimated that in 1992 the total of F-16 aircraft will be reduced from 72 to 57 through accidents unless replacements are procured.

The impact of budget cutting has been felt in civil defense where up until 1982 plans called for evacuating one million people from 36 cities. Plans for evacuating the northern most province of Finnmark have been entirely laid aside as it would depend upon the military situation.²³⁰

In the final analysis Norway's ability to survive is not really in question. The true issue is Norway's ability to ensure that her policy of reassurance (which has tailored Norway's force posture since her joining NATO) does not become a policy of "Finnlandization"²³¹ by another name. The reassurance displayed by Norway is

the first index of Finlandization ("consideration of and adjustment to Soviet interests") developed by R.V. Vincent.²³² The Norwegian government's response in crises with the Soviets may be classified as prudent restraint or as cautious deference.

With the local predominance of Soviet forces the fear exists that the Soviet Union might exploit her local superiority by transferring the onus of starting a conflict to the West. This would be a reversal of the roles in the Cuba crisis of 1962. The crisis could conceivably begin by Norway requesting assistance; and despite Norway's frequent assertion that Norway's reservations on foreign troops were a unilateral restriction, the Soviets might assert that it had been a bilateral guarantee and could utilize it as a pretext for entry in Norwegian politics.

In 1949 the Norwegian King issued a statement that, if Norway were invaded, the Norwegian Armed Forces were to resist to the maximum extent possible and disregard orders to the contrary. With the growth of concern over nuclear weapons and the desire to reach agreement on contentious issues with the Soviets, politicians might be tempted to accept a less than totally satisfactory agreement, as shown by the Grey Zone Agreement. Perhaps the true question is not whether the Norwegian Armed Forces would resist or how well, but rather whether they would be given the choice.

What issue would the politicians consider going to war for,
short of an actual invasion?²³³

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

225Johan Jorgen Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy: Options and Constraints," in J.J. Holst, Ed., Five Roads to Nordic Security, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973, p. 79.

226An excellent accounting of the uproar caused by his comments is contained in Tom Pacock, Fighting General, London: Collins Publishing, 1973.

227Desmond Wetten, "Amphibious Warfare: NATO's Northern Flank," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1978, p. 28.

228Major General Magne T. Sorensen, Inspector General of the Royal Norwegian Air Force, "Considerable Quality Improvement in the Air Force," in Jann T. Land, ed., Norwegian Defense Review 1982-1983, Oslo: Norwegian Defense Association, 1983, p. 18.

229John Ausland, Norge og en Tredje Verdenskrig (Norway and a Third World War), Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983, p. 41.

230Ausland, p. 92.

231Finlandization is a term used to describe Finland's special relationship with the Soviet Union. While ostensibly neutral and under the cloak of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the Sovierignty of a country becomes reduced as it defers to Sovier wishes. Walter Laquer, "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization," Commentary, December 1977, p. 37.

232R.J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 119, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975, p. 19.

233 Many analysts hold that short of an actual invasion Norway will never change her bans on nuclear weapons or foreign forces.

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